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ABSTRACT 
 An accurate understanding of the Chinese decision-making process is critical to 
anticipating and deescalating Sino-American crises through effective crisis management.  
Although rational models of decision making have been heavily used to explain state 
decisions, some outcomes do not fit rational assumptions, leaving questions of state 
intentions seemingly ambiguous and unanswered.  This study uses an organization-
centered, cybernetic approach and assumes:  1) that alternatives considered by a 
government reside in the existing capabilities of the state’s institutions, and 2) decision-
making outcomes are characterized as governmental actions through organizational 
routines.  After identifying three functional decision-making variables (how a decision-
making process manages complexity, deals with uncertainty, and adapts to change), this 
research tests the general structure and current trends in PRC politics for evidence that 
Beijing uses cybernetic methods when deciding how to resolve complex problems.  
Additionally, this study selects five recent near-crisis events (1999 Belgrade embassy 
bombing, 2001 EP-3 midair collision, 2002-03 SARS outbreak, 2007 PRC anti-satellite 
test, and 2008 Sichuan earthquake response) for a cross-case analysis of these same three 
variables in times of crisis.  This research offers unique insight in both the applicability of 
the cybernetic model in PRC analysis as well as expectations of Beijing’s future decision 
making under stress. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE AND RELEVANCE 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide greater understanding of the PRC 
decision-making process so that American policy-makers, military commanders, and 
intelligence analysts can better interpret and predict Beijing’s behavior both under normal 
circumstances as well as during times of crisis.  It pierces the opacity of Chinese politics 
by systematically applying knowledge of organizational behavior and cybernetic 
mechanisms to Beijing’s decision-making structure and process.  Furthermore, it 
advances the current understanding of Sino-American crisis management by conducting a 
comparative analysis of the five most significant conflicts over the past decade.  For 
quick reference, many of the key takeaways of this study are provided in the conclusions 
of Chapter VI and the summary sections of Chapters III, IV, and V. 
Research on this topic is important for three reasons.  First, the potential costs of 
Sino-American conflict range from high to incalculable.  A healthy relationship between 
the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is critical to the improved 
welfare, stability, and security of both countries.  Over the past four decades, Sino-
American relations have become increasingly more complicated and convoluted, 
engaging a plethora of moving parts in all domains, including social, political-diplomatic, 
economic, and military.  Conflicts that arise between the two countries, if not properly 
managed, can quickly devolve into cascading sequences of unintended consequences that 
undermine vital economic and financial cooperation and escalate security tensions in 
each government’s national security organizations.  Even without considering that both 
countries maintain advanced arsenals of weaponry, including weapons of mass 
destruction, purely economic costs incurred with decreased trade and the potentially 
destabilizing and damaging effects of surging nationalism to both short and long-term 
interests of each country elevate the importance of successfully interpreting and 
predicting the other’s decision-making behavior.   
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Secondly, due to the expansive, evolving government organizations in both the 
United States and China, as well as to the opacity and complexity of Beijing’s leadership 
decision-making processes, the likelihood of one state misunderstanding the intentions of 
the other or misinterpreting (or simply missing) the other’s signals is greatly increased.  
That Washington is often surprised or confused about PRC decisions illustrates the lack 
of adequate knowledge of the Chinese system, its rules, and its routines.     
Finally, moments of crisis are especially problematic for Sino-American 
communication.  During Sino-American crises, decision makers on both sides most often 
failed to see the conflict coming and were therefore unprepared for the intense demands 
imposed by the complexity and uncertainty of the situation.  These moments have the 
potential to bring the worst as well as the best out in the leadership of each nation, and as 
mentioned above, the stakes are usually very high.  The ability to deescalate a conflict 
and restore international stability during these moments of crisis largely rests on each 
country’s understanding of the other’s decision-making process.          
The approach this study employs differs from others of its kind in three 
substantial ways.  First, it makes use of a readily available but little used source of 
insight—the scholarly knowledge of how organizations work.  With this knowledge, it 
then approaches the problem by seeing China not as a rational actor, but rather as an 
organization.  In doing so, it overcomes a formidable obstacle that most other studies on 
the topic run into—the opacity of the Chinese system.  In much the same way that sight-
impaired individuals grow accustomed to the standard features or dimensions of rooms, 
stairs, or sidewalks that they frequently encounter, this study identifies key features or 
functions of organizational structure and behavior and applies it to better visualize and 
predict the nature of a specific subject—Chinese politics.  Although some aspects of 
organizational design may not perfectly fit the intricacies of the PRC system, this study 
argues for the applicability of examining Beijing in this manner by focusing on key 
fundamental variables of decision-making processes that exhibit isomorphic qualities 
among a wide variety of organizations including national leadership structures.  
Secondly, this study of Chinese decision making does not rely on assumptions of 
rationality.  Instead, it takes a cybernetic approach based on different decision rules and 
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organizational routines.  As a result, many occurrences in Chinese behavior that the 
majority of observers have attributed to misjudgment, ignorance, factional conflict, or 
faulty execution by Chinese leaders are explained as “the expected result of coherent, 
well-established, normally operating decision processes.”1   
Finally, this study is designed for the operational decision maker and intelligence 
analyst as well as the scholar.  As such, it takes into account that its audience is short on 
time and typically saturated with other demands, and, therefore, communicates its 
findings in an easily-accessible, operational format while retaining the rigorous methods, 
evidence, and documentation of scholarly research. 
B. METHOD AND EVIDENCE 
The problem is to understand both how and why Chinese leaders make the 
decisions they do.  The hypothesis is that Beijing makes decisions through a combination 
of cybernetic mechanisms and processes rather than through the widely accepted 
assumptions and processes of the rational model.  First, this study defines the features of 
the two approaches to decision making that are contrasted here—rational and 
cybernetic—and frames them as the independent variables of this scientific inquiry.   
Secondly, two separate tests are conducted in order to determine which model is 
more useful in explaining Beijing’s decision-making behavior.  These tests are both 
structured along three lines of analysis (also labeled as key functional variables) that 
typify the core features of both the rational and cybernetic models.  These variables are: 
 How does Beijing manage complexity? 
 How does Beijing deal with uncertainty? 
 How does Beijing adapt to change? 
The first test takes a broad look at the trends that have shaped Chinese politics 
over the past thirty years (since the initiation of reforms under Deng Xiaoping).  Through 
content analysis of official policy statements, public announcements, and leadership 
                                                 
1 John D. Steinbruner, Some Effects of Decision Procedures on Policy Outcomes:  A Series of 
Experiments Using Policy Games (Cambridge, MA:  Center for International Studies, MIT, 1970), 125. 
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accounts, several data points are used to characterize the mindset of the current PRC 
leadership and the nature of the Chinese decision-making process.  These data are 
supplemented by observations of policy actions as well as indications of political reform 
provided by several veteran analysts of Chinese politics.   
The second test proceeds along the same three lines of inquiry and is a 
comparative study of five crisis cases that have confronted the Chinese government over 
the past decade.  These five cases were chosen because they each represent complex 
situations that forced Beijing to quickly decide on an acceptable course of action under 
conditions of risk.  All five cases are current enough that most if not all of the current 
leadership under PRC President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao were intimately 
involved in the decision-making process.  The evidence used to illustrate the nature of 
Chinese decision making during these crises is drawn from official PRC statements, 
demands, and responses as well as the insights of several Chinese and American analysts, 
many of whom were also involved in the crisis management process.  The five cases are:  
 Accidental U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade (1999) 
 Midair collision of a PRC F-8 and a U.S. EP-3E (2001) 
 SARS outbreak (2002-03) 
 Unannounced PRC launch of an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon (2007) 
 Sichuan earthquake (2008) 
After demonstrating the applicability of the cybernetic model in Chinese decision 
making, the study concludes with several implications based in cybernetic logic and 
focused on explaining Beijing’s behavior under stress. 
C. OUTLINE 
This thesis is divided into three sections.  The first section establishes the 
foundations upon which the remainder of the study is based.  Following this introduction, 
Chapter II defines the features of both the rational and cybernetic models.  It begins by 
showing where each model resides in the overall field of choice-based decision-making 
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research.  It then describes and contrasts the features of each model and examines the 
three functional variables that serve as the principal lines of inquiry in the following two 
tests. Chapter III describes the Chinese decision-making structure.  It establishes the flow 
of authority and responsibility through the three hierarchies in the Chinese government—
the party, military, and state.  It examines this structure from both administrative and 
operational perspectives and from the top levels to the regional and local organs of each 
bureaucracy. 
The second section conducts two separate tests to determine the nature of 
Beijing’s decision-making process.  Chapter IV takes a broad view significant trends that 
have shaped the current character of Chinese politics.  Chapter V focuses on the five 
crisis case studies listed above for evidence supporting one of the two decision-making 
models.  Both tests follow the three lines of inquiry of the key functional variables.  Each 
test ends with a summary of findings.   
The final section—Chapter VI—summarizes the key findings of the study.   
Conclusions are divided into two categories:  those pertaining to the use of the cybernetic 
approach in international relations study, and those pertaining to the nature of Chinese 
crisis decision making.  The study ends with suggestions for fellow intelligence 
professionals and promising areas for additional research.  
 6
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II. CONCEPTUAL DECISION-MAKING MODEL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The theories considered in this study share a key assumption:  that international 
relations and the nature of state-to-state interactions are dependent on the choices of 
involved state governments.  Decision makers in their respective governments will be 
confronted with problems and will consequently have to decide upon a response from a 
field of options.  Depending on what option is chosen and how this action is employed 
will largely determine the foreign counter-responses and domestic support and will 
ultimately influence the overall outcome.  Yet decision makers are not unitary actors but 
instead operate within the constraints of a governmental structure and process, no matter 
how authoritarian the government may be.  Therefore, a better understanding of the 
structure and decision-making process in addition to the actors and environment is critical 
to predicting policy outcomes.  This process with its institutional actors, rules, and unique 
norms of behavior contains the explanatory power sought in this analysis.  
The study of decision making in general has advanced the understanding of how 
individuals and groups approach problems, determine response options, and execute 
action.  Organizational analysis has yielded significant insights into how large groups of 
individual actors arrange themselves to accomplish a common mission.  The research in 
this genre has varied from focusing on governmental policy debates to improving 
corporate business management practices to studying the psychological characteristics of 
the actual individuals making choices.  Much of the theoretical work in decision-making 
theory has occurred since the beginnings of the Cold War—a time when risks were 
abundant, potential consequences catastrophic, and involved states were forced confront 
unstructured problems in complex environments with less than complete information 
(many times with hardly any specific, relevant intelligence at all).  This thesis recognizes 
that although the Cold War is over and the chance of large-scale nuclear war is more 
remote, many of these fundamental decision making conditions still characterize many 
state-to-state interactions including those of China and the United States.  Out of 
necessity, an understanding of decision making and organizational design emerged in the 
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past to fill the gap of available knowledge.  In light of the opaque nature of Chinese 
internal politics and the potential high costs of relationship decline, the application of 
useful, relevant decision theory is required now in order to interpret and predict Beijing’s 
behavior.  Although outside observers may not have sufficient information to place 
names, faces, and personal preferences with most seats of power in the Chinese central 
government, significant insight can be gained by examining the PRC system through the 
accumulated lessons learned from decades of decision making and organizational study. 
This chapter provides a review of literature in the history of decision-making 
theory and establishes a theoretical spectrum of choice-based models.  It then compares 
two principal approaches to decision making—the rational actor model and the 
cybernetic model—in their features and overall applicability in the complex, risky, 
rapidly-changing  environment that now confronts international relations analysis.   
B. REVIEW OF DECISION-MAKING LITERATURE 
The purpose of this literature review on decision-making theory is threefold.  
First, it orients the reader with an overview of different models currently in use in 
decision-making science and highlights some of the prominent scholars that have shaped 
this field.  Secondly, it shows the inherent connections between decision-making theory 
and the larger studies of political science and international relations.  Thirdly, it shows 
where a variety of approaches is positioned on a spectrum of choice-based models 
(Figure 1).  While the focus of this study is simply to contrast the applicability of the two 
fundamental models of this spectrum (rational and cybernetic), it acknowledges that other 
models that blend these two approaches have been constructed and practiced with varying 
levels of success depending on the situation being analyzed.  This study does not deny the 
overall validity of any of these models (which are helpful in certain contexts or 
situations) but instead seeks only to demonstrate the enhanced utility of the cybernetic 
model in explaining Chinese leadership decision making. 
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Figure 1.   Spectrum of Choice-Based Models 
Choice-based models have been used to explain state behavior and international 
relations since Thucydides chronicled the interactions of the city-states of Athens, Sparta, 
and others during the Peloponnesian War2 and Chinese strategist Sun Tzu explained to 
regional warlords the art of engaging an adversary through effective decision making.3  
These models focus on the national decision-making process as the key to understanding 
policy outcomes in many domains including economics,4 politics, sociology, and 
psychology.  
The rational actor model has long dominated the decision-making assumptions of 
international relations and accompanies realist arguments in the works of George 
Kennan,5 Hans Morgenthau,6 Thomas Schelling,7 and Henry Kissinger.8  It assumes that 
decision makers make choices according to which option best supplies the greatest utility.  
Schelling concisely defined the rational model of choice by claiming that at its 
foundation resides “the assumption of rational behavior—not just intelligent behavior, 
                                                 
2 Robert B. Strassler, ed., The Landmark Thucydides:  A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian 
War (New York:  Free Press, 1996). 
3 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Thomas Cleary (Boston:  Shambhala Publications, Inc., 2000). 
4 Economics have largely contributed to the growth of these studies.  Adam Smith helped to shape the 
trajectory of global economics in the late 18th century by arguing that the decision-making processes of 
states could be equated to the choices of individual households.  See Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations (New 
York:  Random House, 1937).   
5 George F. Kennan, “Morality and Foreign Policy,” (1985) in At a Century’s Ending:  Reflections, 
1982–1995, ed. George F. Kennan (New York:  W.W. Norton, 1996), 270–279. 
6 Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 4th Edition (New York:  Knopf, 1970). 
7 Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1960). 
8 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York:  Simon and Schuster, 1994). 
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but of behavior motivated by a conscious calculation of advantages, a calculation that in 
turn is based on an explicit and internally consistent value system.”9  Veteran diplomat 
Kissinger expressly praised the rational statecraft as the clearest articulation of a 
country’s unitary vision “unfettered by the morass of governmental politics.”10  Much of 
the recent work in rational actor theory has focused on creating game theory models that 
accomplish simple rational choice simulations in structured environments.11 One of the 
strongest criticisms of game theory has been that simplified models of state-to-state 
interactions fail to grasp the true complexity of the multi-dimension problems that face 
decision makers in reality—rarely are conflicts structured so neatly into a simple choice 
between two mutually-exclusive alternatives.12  In response, spatial choice theory 
conceptualizes the array of various options as a “space” where the chosen action is a 
point that represents a chosen equilibrium along multiple axes at once.13  Confronting 
another serious criticism of the rational actor model, Herbert Simon forwards the idea of 
bounded rationality, which acknowledges that although rationality is still the core 
principle of decision making, rational choices are performed within the constraints of the 
environmental framework.14 
                                                 
9 Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 4.  
10 Henry Kissinger, A World Restored:  Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812–
1822 (Boston:  Houghton Mifflin, 1957), 329, as cited in Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of 
Decision:  Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Second Edition (New York:  Addison-Wesley Educational 
Publishers, Inc., 1999), 29. 
11 J. Von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 2nd Edition 
(Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1947); and Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual 
Values (New York:  John Wiley, 1951) as cited in Xinsheng Liu, Modeling Bilateral International 
Relations:  The Case of U.S.-China Interactions (New York:  Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 11.  For rational 
games that focus on conflict and crisis management, see Lewis F. Richardson, Arms and Insecurity 
(Pittsburgh:  Boxwood Press, 1960).  For rational games that focus on cooperation see Robert Axelrod, 
“The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists,” American Political Science Review 75 (June 1981):  306–
18.  See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ:  Princeton 
University Press, 1976) for an examination of the various levels of analysis in rational modeling. 
12 Peter Bennett, “Modeling Decisions in International Relations:  Game Theory and Beyond,” 
Mershon International Studies Review 39 (1995):  19–52. 
13 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York:  Harper and Row, 1957); Clifton 
T. Morgan, “A Spatial Model of Crisis Bargaining,” International Studies Quarterly 28 (December 1984):  
407–26. 
14 Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior:  A Study of Decision-making Processes in 
Administrative Organization (New York:  MacMillan, 1947). 
 11
Accompanying many institutionalist theories of international relations are models 
of decision making that, while continuing to see states are unitary actors, view state 
choices as being shaped by the state’s domestic politics—outcomes are seen as the 
products of rational bargaining between various institutions.15  
Approaching the center of the spectrum illustrated above from the cognitive side, 
an alternative school of thought was invigorated in the mid-20th century. At that time, 
many critics of the dominant rational model, upon observing prominent historical events 
that by all accounts did not adhere to principles of rational decision making (including for 
example the 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor as well as the 1967 Egyptian Army’s 
mobilization against a superiorly armed Israel), were motivated to contest its validity.16  
These observations led some scholars to reason that states do not always act rationally—
that the limits of human intellectual capacity (or even a computer’s analytical capacity for 
that matter) are inherently incapable of processing the infinite range of options available 
in confronting any problem.17  The cognitive family of models, consequently, seeks to 
explain decision making by observing the process rather than the expected outcome, 
realizing that all choices are made under some form of cognitive constraint.  As Michael 
Doyle points out, “state structures matter:  the structure of their domestic governments 
and the values and views of their citizens affect their behavior in international affairs.”18 
The cybernetic model (the approach used here) theorizes that a decision maker’s 
access to information and response options are restricted to and determined by the 
institutional rules and organizational routines currently in existence.  Consequently, 
understanding the structure and identity of institutions within the organization and the 
                                                 
15 Robert Keohane, “Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War,” in Neorealism 
and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. David Baldwin (New York:  Columbia University 
Press, 1993).  The decision-making models of “rational actor,” “bounded rationality”, and “bargaining” are 
compared in Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations:  Bargaining, Decision Making, 
and Systems Structure in International Crises (Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1977). 
16 John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision:  New Dimensions of Political Analysis 
(Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1974), 47. 
17 Charles E. Lindblom, “The Science of “Muddling Through,” Public Administration Review 19:2 
(1959):  79–88. 
18 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 39.  Also see Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and 
Peace:  Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism (New York:  W.W. Norton, 1997), 211, 383, 420. 
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standard operating procedures they employ when perceiving and responding to a problem 
is the basis for predicting the state’s behavior in the international environment.19  
Cognitive psychology models oppose assumptions of rationality by focusing on the 
limited cognitive processes and psychological tendencies of the individual decision 
makers.20  The serial attention shift model explores the role of leaders’ limited attention 
spans and argues that decisions are partially determined by what aspects the decision 
maker’s attention was focused on just prior to actually making the choice.21  Some 
scholars of poliheuristic methods combine both psychological and rational methods in 
multi-step, hybrid models.22 
C. CHOOSING A MODEL:  RATIONAL OR CYBERNETIC? 
Although, as illustrated above, there is a wide spectrum of choice-based theories 
of decision making, the poles of this assortment are the rational and the cybernetic 
models—everything in between is some mixture of both.  In order to demonstrate the 
under-appreciated value of the cybernetic model as contrasted with the heavily used 
rational approach, this study begins with a side-by-side appraisal of both.  Once the key 
features of each are understood, the specific nature of Chinese decision making can be 
ascertained in the tests that follow.  This appraisal is framed around four fundamental 
characteristics and three functional variables (refer to Table 1). 
 
 
                                                 
19 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 145.  Steinbruner, Cybernetic Theory of Decision, 57.  
William Ross Ashby, An Introduction to Cybernetics (New York:  John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1956). 
20 Gordon M. Becker and Charles G. McClintock, “Value:  Behavioral Decision Theory,” Annual 
Review of Psychology, 18 (1967):  239–286.  For discussion on cognitive decision-making “short-cuts” or 
heuristics, see Richard K. Herrmann and Michael P. Fischerkeller, “Beyond the Enemy Image and Spiral 
Model:  Cognitive—Strategic Research after the Cold War,” International Organization 49 (1995):  415–
50.  For emphasis of the role of individual perceptions and motivations, see Jervis, Perception and 
Misperception.  For individual tendencies in estimating and responding to risk, see Jack S. Levy, “An 
Introduction to Prospect Theory,” Political Psychology 13:2 (1992). 
21 Bryan D. Jones, Reconceiving Decision-Making in Democratic Politics:  Attention, Choice, and 
Public Policy (Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press, 1994). 
22 Alex Mintz, “How Do Leaders Make Decisions?  A Poliheuristic Perspective,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 48:1 (2004):  3–13. 
 13






























































1. Fundamental Characteristics 
The rational actor and cybernetic models are first contrasted according to basic 
yet highly determinate conditions that shape the structure and method by which each 
model then performs the three key functions that are later examined.  These fundamental 
characteristics are the defining principles of “rational” and “cybernetic” mechanisms, the 
unit of analysis upon which each model focuses, the logic or reasoning that underlies 
each, and the criteria by which each model searches for solutions. 
a. Defining Principle 
Rational Actor:  The defining principle of the rational actor model is a 
reliance on rationality to determine choice.  However, due to the frequent and often 
improper use of the term “rational” in the discourses of international relations and 
political science, it is necessary to begin an examination of this model by defining the 
term and contrasting it to the expanded meaning it has often assumed when connected to 
the rational choice theory.  
By one dictionary, “rational” is associated to something being done in 
accordance with reason or logic.23  Common synonyms of rational are lucid, balanced, 
sane, normal, cogent, and coherent.  From the definition itself, the rational theory takes 
on a normative appearance—that it is the way decisions should be made.  This 
understanding of the term was reinforced by its early use to describe economic 
behavior—that any sane, normal individual leading his or her household would choose 
from among all the possible options the outcome that will maximize his potential utility.  
Yet even though the common sense appeal of the concept has remained attached to the 
term as it has spread from the economic domain to the political and international relations 
domains, the underlying conditions that support its usage in explaining decision-making 
behavior are less attainable in the real world than may be assumed.  In short, just because 
a chosen outcome may not be deemed “rational” by rational theory does not mean that it 
is not equally or even more “acceptable” as a policy decision. 
                                                 
23Christine A. Lindberg, ed., The Oxford American College Dictionary (New York:  Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 1126.  
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The term “rational” as it is used to define the rational actor theory of 
decision making more describes a process of deciding on a certain outcome than it judges 
the suitability of any particular outcome.  Although a “rational” choice is seen as being 
the choice that provides the greatest utility, “rationality” is the process of consciously 
contemplating all possible alternatives, comparing the utility of all options, and choosing 
the one outcome that will most successfully achieve the objectives of the decision maker.  
It is this defining process that makes the rational choice model susceptible to criticism.  
As many opponents have pointed out, complete contemplation of all possible options 
requires perfect knowledge of all possible alternatives.  This includes not only the options 
that differ a great deal from each other, but also all the options that differ only slightly 
from each other—creating in most cases an infinite number of possible alternatives to 
match even the simplest of problems.  As experienced in the real world, when faced with 
a simple problem, it is more likely to not have enough information than to have perfect, 
comprehensive knowledge.  When faced with complex problems, it is impossible to have 
perfect information to even identify the infinite possible outcomes much less predict the 
unforeseen first, second, of third order consequences of any particular course of action.   
Accomplishing a choice in the manner demanded in the rational actor 
model requires an actor to complete a rigorous comparison of values between a diverse 
set of possible outcomes.  However while this can be accomplished more readily in 
economics where prices and exchange rates can standardize values across baskets of 
diverse goods, when translating the rational process to politics, there are many situations 
where finding a standard unit of measure can be difficult.  What is the accurate unit of 
utility when assessing national security?  Number of troops … strategic partnerships … 
size of defense budget?  Furthermore, assuming a measure of security could be 
determined, how could it be objectively compared to the value of economic 
modernization or social development or any one of many other dimensions of the 
political environment?  As already illustrated, there is more to the principle of rationality 
within the rational actor model than at first meets the eye. 
Cybernetic Model:  Cybernetics is the study of automatic control 
mechanisms in both machine as well as human systems.  The defining principle of the 
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cybernetic model is organizational rule—the ability of a collection of organizations to 
self-regulate and problem-solve through predetermined programs of action.  The 
institution performing a certain function is engineered to automatically sense when 
performance is not meeting acceptable standards and to respond by enacting an 
appropriate routine to return performance to acceptable standards.  Overall, an 
organization completes a multitude of complex tasks by managing an assortment of 
specialized institutions.  The decision maker selects an outcome not by creating it, but by 
turning on or off certain existing capabilities. 
Some of the earliest research in cybernetics took place in medical science 
and biology where it has been used to explain the intricacies of human anatomy including 
the body’s ability to sense an injury and clot a wound24 as well as the repeatedly 
successful behavior of simple creatures like honeybees or ants.25  Its usefulness, however, 
extends even into common, everyday decision making.  One example of a cybernetic 
process is seen in the baseball player that is confronting a skillful pitcher on the mound.  
As the ball is released, the batter has to quickly decide how to respond.  If one assumed 
that the batter is an analytical decision maker acting on rational choice, then one would 
have to determine all the possible options that the batter must choose from.  Imagine, for 
instance, that this pitcher has demonstrated three pitches (the curve ball, the breaking 
ball, and the fastball), the batter has three swings (the low swing, level swing, and check 
swing), and the ball can go any of three locations in the field (left field, center field, right 
field) at three possible distances (bunt, line drive, or deep).  In order to compare all 
options and calculate the single course of action that will bring the maximum utility, the 
batter would have reviewed a total of 81 possible combinations prior to responding (and 
even this is a simplified version of the infinite variety of possible options available).  This 
is clearly not the process used by any successful batter since the time required to 
complete the analytical calculation could easily have taken a good portion of entire game 
not to mention resulted in an easy strikeout.  However, the batter, thinking cybernetically, 
                                                 
24 William Ross Ashby was a prominent British psychiatrist and pioneer in the field of cybernetics.  
See William Ross Ashby, Design for a Brain: The Origin of Adaptive Behavior, Second Edition (New 
York:  John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960). 
25 Steinbruner, Cybernetic Theory of Decision, 48. 
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can quickly narrow the range of possible options that he has to contemplate to only the 
ones that fit the nature of the situation—as he sees ball leave the hand of the pitcher, or 
judges the current situation on the field, many of the above courses of action may quickly 
be determined inappropriate.  The batter then acts according to routines that have been 
rehearsed, with a mind to lessons learned from successful (or not so successful) previous 
experiences in similar circumstances as well as the rules of the game.  The batter can 
respond in time through this simplified decision-making process and the game goes on.  
In the same way, cybernetic processes allow national policy decision makers to solve 
complex problems by using organizational rules and standard operating procedures. 
b. Basic Unit of Analysis 
Rational Actor Model:  Although the principle of rationality can be 
applied to the decision-making process of individuals as well as groups of individuals, in 
international relations, the rational actor model is typically applied to the unitary action of 
a nation as a whole.  In this construct, states are the primary actors and governmental 
action is seen as choice—the expression of a single view of national purpose and 
intention—an action “chosen as a calculated solution to a strategic problem.”26  Most 
people either explicitly or implicitly apply the rational actor model when describing the 
behavior of other states.  As some scholars observe, “the assumption that occurrences in 
foreign affairs are the acts of nations has been so fundamental to thinking about such 
problems that the underlying model has rarely been recognized.”27  This is commonly 
evident in the vernacular used to describe world affairs by using statements such as 
“China is trying to do this” or “Washington has decided to do that.”   
Cybernetic Model:  This model sees the primary actors as the 
organizations and governmental action as organizational output.  The decision makers’ 
“choices” are limited to the existing repertoire of organizational capabilities and 
constrained by the flexibility of standard organizational routines and rules that are 
                                                 
26 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 15. 
27 Ibid., 15–16. 
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inherent to any organization.28  Although the cybernetic approach acknowledges that 
individuals make up these organizations, it aggregates individual behavior to the level of 
the organization that defines the overall identity of the group.  This model differs from 
other bureaucratic bargaining models by not assuming the principle of rational choice or 
seeing outcomes as spoils from competitive bouts between institutions and instead 
focusing on the role of existing organizational capabilities and programs in the decision-
making process. 
c. Logic 
Rational Actor Model:  The reasoning of the rational model is the logic 
of consequence.  This concept assumes that decisions are evaluated based upon their 
expected consequences and ordered according to preferences.  These preferences are 
based upon the future desired end-state of the decision maker, typically expressed in the 
form of goals or strategic objectives.  As long-time scholar of decision-making theory 
James March observes, this logic proceeds through a series of four questions the decision 
maker must answer:   
1) What determines the alternatives that I am to consider?   
2) What are the possible consequences and probability of those   
       consequences occurring with all of these alternatives? 
3) How valuable are the predicted consequences of each alternative? 
  4) How should I choose one of these alternatives in terms of value?29 
Cybernetic Model:  The reasoning employed in the cybernetic model is 
the logic of appropriateness.  Whereas rational decision makers seek to match actions to 
the desired consequences, cybernetic decision makers strive to match rules and identities 
appropriate to the situation to the problem in order to create a solution.  The rules and 
identities that it chooses from to create that solution are present in the unique institutions 
within the organization.  East institution is created to perform a unique task.  Each 
                                                 
28 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 144–46. 
29James G. March, A Primer on Decision Making:  How Decisions Happen (New York:  The Free 
Press, 1994), 3–4.  
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institution or part of the organization thus develops a unique understanding of how it can 
and should contribute to the overall mission of the state through its respective capability 
and desire for autonomy and resources.  Unique organizational identities are created and 
perpetuated throughout the membership of that group and operations are conducted 
according to norms of appropriate behavior.  The decision maker, when applying the 
logic of appropriateness, is confronted with three questions: 
1) What kind of situation is this? 
2) What is my organizational role or identity? 
3) In this organizational capacity, what is it appropriate to do—what rules 
should I follow in confronting this situation?30            
d. Search 
Rational Actor Model:  Search is the process of dedicating attention to 
retrieve and process information on alternative courses of action prior to making a choice.  
Since the principle of rationality requires that all possible options be evaluated in terms of 
expected utility in order to find the single alternative that will bring the most preferred 
outcome, attention must be devoted to a holistic search of available options.  This is a 
value-maximizing search that seeks the one best option no matter how many alternatives 
are included in the field of possible choices.  In this search, goals are the preferences 
against which alternatives are measured.  Additionally, the rational search is a 
compensatory search.  If a certain alternative has a low expected utility in one dimension 
(defined as an organizing theme such as political, military, or economic) but 
simultaneously a high expected utility in another, then one balances out the other.  The 
rational search is also order-insensitive.  Since all alternatives are being objectively 
considered, then regardless of what order the options are presented to the decision maker, 
the choice will be the same.31 
                                                 
30 March, A Primer on Decision Making, 58. 
31 Xinsheng Liu, “The Poliheuristic Theory of Decision and the Cybernetic Theory of Decision:  A 
Comparative Examination,” in Integrating Cognitive and Rational Theories of Foreign Policy Decision 
Making, ed. Alex Mintz (New York:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 151. 
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Cybernetic Model:  Cybernetic search is non-holistic since all possible 
alternatives are not considered when making a choice.  Instead of finding the single best 
solution, decision makers search for the first solution that meets the qualifications needed 
to resolve the situation—a “satisficing” search.32  Goals serve as “trigger points” rather 
than specific outcome preferences, leading some to characterize the search pattern as 
thermostatic.  When a thermostat (a cybernetic servomechanism) detects that 
performance is not meeting the acceptable limits, the search function to restore 
equilibrium in initiated.  When the room temperature meets acceptable standards, the 
thermostat halts performance.  Unlike the rational process, the thermostat at no time 
calculates a specific, optimal degree of temperature in between limits as a goal.33  Other 
ways to describe this search pattern is failure-driven and success-driven.  Additionally, 
the cybernetic search is non-compensatory.  Since comparative value calculations are 
avoided, a high value in one dimension cannot compensate for a low value in another.  If 
value conflicts arise in the process of the cybernetic search, the alternative is simply 
determined to not meet the necessary criteria and is discarded.34  Cybernetic search is  
also order-sensitive.  Since the decision maker is not conducting a comprehensive search 
and instead is willing to adopt the first alternative that meets the demands of the situation, 
the order in which the alternatives are presented can result in a dramatic difference in the 
specific nature of the accepted course of action and, consequently, the characteristics of 
the ultimate outcome.35  
2. Key Functional Variables 
Any decision-making process suitable for the real world of foreign policy and 
international relations must function in an environment of complexity, uncertainty, and 
change.  Observing how the rational actor and cybernetic models cope with these 
conditions provides the framework of inquiry for determining the applicability of either 
model in explaining Chinese crisis decision making.  
                                                 
32 March, A Primer on Decision Making, 19. 
33 Ibid., 28. 
34 Steinbruner, Cybernetic Theory of Decision, 64. 
35 Xinsheng, “Comparative Examination,” 151. 
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a. Managing Complexity 
According to well-known professor and pioneer in cybernetic theory John 
Steinbruner, a complex problem includes the following conditions: 
1) Two or more values are affected by the decision. 
2) There is a zero-sum relationship between two conflicting 
alternatives—more of one means less of the other. 
3) Imperfect information increases situational uncertainty. 
4) Decision-making power and responsibility is dispersed over multiple 
actors or organizational units.36 
The foreign policy decision-making domain is a complex environment that 
involves decisions that have the potential to affect many dimensions simultaneously.  As 
the world has become more intricately interconnected, rarely are problems and potential 
solutions structured and controlled as simply as they are in the laboratory.  There is never 
adequate information to eliminate the element of risk. 
Two fundamental aspects of complexity are instrumental in grasping the 
demands this condition places on decision makers.  The problem of scale describes 
complexity that exceeds in volumn the available decision-making capabilities of the 
organization.  The problem of scope describes complexity that exceeds the existing 
expertise of the decision-making capabilities of the organization.  
Rational Actor Model:  The rational model confronts the problem of 
complexity by perpetuating and enacting central goals or objectives in its value 
calculations at all levels of the government.  Since the model would most accurately 
describe a state’s decision-making process if only a single actor’s value calculations were 
involved in the identification and selection of the desired course of action, any inclusion 
of additional decision makers in the process threatens the applicability of the model 
unless these new members act according to the identically same views as the central 
leadership.  A unified purpose is communicated from the central leadership to the other 
                                                 
36 Steinbruner, Cybernetic Theory of Decision, 16. 
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levels of the decision-making process and guides consistent application of rationality.37 
Decision theory scholar Herbert Simon observes that the rational decision maker views 
situations (both current and future) as “states” of reality.  From this pictured desired end 
state the unitary rational actor (the architect) creates a model of behavior that functions as 
a replica for bringing the desired outcome into being—an exact blueprint for all parts of 
the organization to emulate in their individual decision-making processes.38 
This model suffers from two critical weaknesses when managing 
increasingly complex problems.  First, if the government confronts the problem of scale 
by expanding the number of decision makers, it becomes vulnerable.  The more people or 
institutions that are involved in the process, the greater the chances of miscommunication 
or for personal interests to motivate unique actions or value selection that are not in 
accordance with the central blueprint, thereby threatening the cohesive, unitary response 
of the state as a whole.  Secondly, when confronting the problem of scope, since the 
model assumes that perfect information is necessary in order to make a “maximizing” 
choice, as issues become more numerous, diverse, complicated, and inter-related, the 
demand for information and calculation can easily exceed the human or organization’s 
ability to obtain and process it, leading to a breakdown of the rational choice principle, 
perfect emulation of the blueprint, and overall inapplicability of the rational actor model. 
Cybernetic Model:  Instead of pursuing the rational method of countering 
increasing complexity with increasingly elaborate strategies and information systems, the 
cybernetic model overcomes complexity through simplicity.  This model uses the 
organization itself as a way to establish a variety of limited, tightly-focused 
“servomechanisms” for monitoring the environment and problem solving.  A 
servomechanism is any mechanism that uses self-assessed feedback to activate and 
deactivate a regulatory function.  As Simon described, instead of being like an exact 
blueprint or replica of the desired outcome, the cybernetic approach is likened to a recipe 
in that the decision maker (the cook) responds to problems by enacting a sequence of 
steps to reach a solution.  Reality is envisioned as a process rather than as any specific 
                                                 
37 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 17. 
38 Steinbruner, Cybernetic Theory of Decision, 55. 
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state of being.39  Exact emulation of central goals is not required so long as the 
institutions with their unique capabilities perform according to the appropriate rules and 
routines for which they have been established.  
The cybernetic model confronts the problem of scale by limiting the 
attention and interest of each component of the organization to only a few critical 
variables.40  Each institution monitors its respective variable or variables for signs that 
performance is not remaining within tolerable limits.  A prescribed action (based on the 
specific capabilities of the institution) is enacted and the situation is continuously 
monitored until the performance returns the variable to acceptable values, at which point 
performance is decreased and slack is introduced into the system.  By having these 
cybernetic structures hierarchically arranged throughout the organization, institutional 
needs as well as overall national interests are served.41 
The model confronts the problem of scope by fragmenting decision-
making authority and responsibility among a large group of specialized institutions and 
individuals.  Since problems as dealt with as they occur, when a problem arises, a 
particular institution that is best suited to understand and handle the given problem is 
expected to advise leaders on suitable alternatives for restoring equilibrium to the 
variable in question.  By having a diverse group of institutions that manage problems in 
their own respective areas of expertise, the variety of potential issues that may be 
expected to arise in the complex environment of the national policy domain can all be 
handled with knowledgeable attention.  Since this process involves a greater numbers of 
individuals sharing central decision-making responsibilities, cybernetic organizations 
exhibit collective leadership methods where subject matter experts often enjoy significant 
political influence through their consultative connections. 
A weakness of utilizing this method of decision making includes having to 
act within the limited repertoire of existing organizational capabilities.  In addition, since 
                                                 
39 Steinbruner, Cybernetic Theory of Decision, 55. 
40 Ashby, Design for a Brain, 62.  
41 Steinbruner, Cybernetic Theory of Decision, 59. 
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each institution is governed by the rules inherent to its own identity, as each institution 
strives to survive, there is an increased chance that organizational competition and 
advocacy bias will shape the overall outcome in less that beneficial ways.  
b. Dealing with Uncertainty 
An uncertain situation is one that involves an element of risk.  Risk is the 
possibility (or probability) that something that is undesired or unpredicted will occur as a 
result of an initiated action.  Risk is also defined as an exposure to danger.  Therefore, it 
follows that uncertainty in decision making is a result of less than perfect information and 
hazardous situations where the potential costs of failure are high.   
Rational Actor Model:  In the laboratory, the rational model treats 
uncertainty as a statistical problem.42  In expected value calculations, each possible 
alternative is multiplied by the estimated probability it will be the single best choice.  
However, real world decisions are seldom structured this way and more often include 
alternatives that have either infrequently (or never) occurred and therefore are difficult to 
assess.43  As a result, most rational theorists have adopted the concept of subjective 
probability—that the intuitive estimates of risk among alternatives can serve as an 
adequate measure of uncertainty in value calculations.  This approach also assumes that 
subjective risk estimates will be updated as new information becomes available.44    
As has been observed, this method of assessing uncertainty is quite 
shapeless, and “the specificity necessary for any serious explanation or prediction of an 
actual event therefore must be worked out ad hoc for any given application.”45  Having 
such a formless process for estimating risk further illustrates the underlying theme of the 
rational model as a whole—the effort to have perfect information on all alternatives so 
that the optimal choice is obvious and uncertainty is minimal. 
                                                 
42 Steinbruner, Cybernetic Theory of Decision, 32. 
43 Ibid., 33. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 35. 
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Cybernetic Model:  This approach acknowledges the difficulty (or 
impossibility) of having all the information that is necessary to analytically calculate 
uncertainty in real world situations and escapes this problem by avoiding direct outcome 
calculations altogether.  The cybernetic decision maker does not pursue a predetermined 
state of reality or optimal choice and instead simply evaluates whether the available 
alternatives are satisfactory to solve the problem.  The information process within the 
organization generates the options that are appropriate for the situation—there is no need 
for an exhaustive search.  “Cybernetic mechanisms which achieve uncertainty control do 
so by focusing the decision process on a few incoming variables while eliminating 
entirely any serious calculation of probable outcomes.”46  Any information that is not 
relevant to the established organizational routines already available is ignored.  The only 
information that affects the decision maker enters through the designed feedback 
channels of the cybernetic mechanism itself.  Since available information is limited, and 
alternatives are confined to the organizational capabilities and SOPs that already exist, 
uncertainty is minimized. 
c. Adapting to Change 
For any decision-making model to remain applicable in a real world 
environment it must be able to adapt to changes through a process of learning.   
Rational Actor Model:  As discussed above, the rational model includes 
in its value calculation of alternatives any new information that emerges in the process.  
Since new information may alter the causal flow of the outcome by changing the value of 
a particular alternative, this is labeled causal learning.47  Causal learning allows the 
rational decision maker to include in the working model any environmental phenomena 
that was previously excluded—a process called horizontal expansion.  It also allows 
measures of value of alternatives to be altered in order to achieve higher-level goals—
upward expansion.  Causal learning accepts a process of “iterative cycles of analysis” 
through which decision makers expect the “gradual development of analytic calculations 
                                                 
46 Steinbruner, Cybernetic Theory of Decision, 66. 
47 Ibid., 41. 
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in specific issue areas.”48 It remains focused on aspirations for the future state of reality 
(future-dependent) and constantly chooses from all options the best way to reach that 
goal.49  Change, therefore, can occur as significantly or insignificantly, rapidly or slowly, 
as the objectives of the central leadership shift in accordance with their vision of the 
desired end state of being.  Theoretically, this process of change occurs instantaneously 
and smoothly in step with leadership perceptions.     
Cybernetic Model:  Cybernetic decision makers adapt to their 
environments in a very different way called experiential learning—a process where 
interpretations of past experiences shape the appropriateness of organizational routines, 
rules, and identities which in turn affect the capabilities and alternatives available in the 
decision maker’s repertoire.  In this way, experiential learning is history-dependent—“the 
past is seen as imposing itself on the present through retention of experience in 
routines.”50  Changes are made in the rules of the organization instead of its strategy.  
Observations of experiential learning in national policy domains have 
been foundational in studies on the incremental nature of changes that occur in 
bureaucratic routines over time.51  Often described as “muddling through,” the cybernetic 
organization changes gradually in small steps with major change occurring only 
sporadically when a failure demonstrates that institutional performance is unacceptable. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter has examined the contours of the two decision-making approaches 
being tested in this study—the rational and cybernetic models.  With the variables now 
defined, the next chapter will lay the foundations of an analysis of Chinese decision 
making by describing the structure, actors, and flow of authority in the organization. 
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50 Ibid., 80. 
51 Lindblom, “Science of Muddling Through.” 
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III. PRC DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURE AND PROCESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Chinese government is an intensely organized, hierarchical system shaped by 
both formal and informal command relationships.  An understanding of the building 
blocks of this complex political system is necessary prior to further testing the system for 
the applicability of any specific decision-making approach or realizing relevant insight 
into Beijing’s decision-making behavior. 
B. NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURE 
The power and authority of the Chinese government when responding to national 
security issues is fundamentally contained in three vertical sectors:  the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) apparatus, the military headed by the Central Military 
Commission (CMC), and the state government apparatus. These vertical hierarchies 
extend downward into central, provincial, prefectural, county, and township levels.  
 
Figure 2.   Party, State, and Military Hierarchies in the PRC Structure 
1. Party Decision-Making Apparatus 
The CCP retains the ultimate control over national security decision-making 
mechanisms in the Chinese government.  Mao Zedong recognized in his writings from 
1938 that “Every Communist must grasp the truth, ‘Political Power grows out of the 
barrel of the gun.’  Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must 
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never be allowed to control the Party.”52  Although some specific aspects of Chinese 
civil-military relations are opaque to an outside observer, the party formally maintains 
power over the national security domain with key positions in the decision-making 
process being held solely by high-level party officials.53  As is also quickly apparent in 
an examination of the party, state, and military areas of responsibility, much of the 
potential bureaucratic conflict at the top levels of the government is avoided by having 
the same group of high-level party officials in multiple positions at once spanning the 
entire structure.  China unquestionably remains a party-government.   
The following discussion of the party apparatus is divided into four parts:  1) the 
top level of the CCP as embodied in the National Party Congress and the Party Central 
Committee, 2) the operational core of the party decision-making structure in the Political 
Bureau and the Politburo Standing Committee, 3) the CCP staff system principally 
contained in the Secretariat and General Office, and 4) the Leading Small Group. 
a. National Party Congress and Party Central Committee 
The CCP is a hierarchically arranged, Leninist-style organization with 
multiple tiers of party cadre.  The National Party Congress is the largest of the party 
organs, comprising fifteen hundred or more members that meet every five years to debate 
major policy initiatives that require overall consensus.  Although this is the seat of 
legitimacy and authority in the Chinese government, its function could most readily be 
compared to that of a party national convention in the United States.  While it is 
instrumental in establishing the policy platform of the central leadership and elevating 
members to the Central Committee, it lacks an operational role in the day-to-day business 
of the country.  At the 17th Party Congress, which met 15–21 October 2007, the primary 
items of business were to review the work of the previous congress, amend the CCP 
                                                 
52 Mao Zedong, “Problems of War and Strategy,” 6 November 1938 as cited in Dennis J. Blasko, The 
Chinese Army Today:  Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century (New York: Routledge, 2006), 6.  
53 This is not to say that top military leaders do not have significant power for indeed the PLA, 
although occupying far fewer seats in the top party meetings, still has substantial influence in the shaping, 
interpreting, and implementing national security decisions.  However, the CCP remains overall in charge. 
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constitution to reflect the adoption of Hu Jintao’s “Scientific Development concept,” and 
to select the 17th Central Committee membership. 
The second level of the party organization is the Central Committee, a 
body of several hundred members that meets a couple times a year to review high-level 
policy initiatives and to make appointments to other key leadership bodies.  Most of the 
members on the Central Committee hold other more operationally-significant political 
positions in the government as well.  For the most part, this body discusses and 
announces policies without deciding upon them54 and overlooks the work of the Political 
Bureau whose membership it appoints.  The first plenum of the 17th Central Committee 
reappointed Hu Jintao as the party general secretary and appointed a new Political 
Bureau, Standing Committee, Secretariat, and Central Military Commission. 
In addition to the Politburo, the Central Committee is organized into four 
functional Central Committee departments to handle various issue areas at the national 
level.  These are the Organization department (responsible for personnel appointments), 
the Propaganda department (responsible for media, education, and political image), the 
United Front department (responsible for relations with non-communist parties and 
associations in Chinese society), and the International Liaison department (responsible 
for political relations with other communist parties).55  Two additional organizations 
included in the core functions of the Central Committee are the Policy Research Office 
and the General Office, which are discussed in more detail below under the party staff 
system.  The heads of these organizations are also high-ranking members of the Politburo 
and, in addition, may be members of the Secretariat.  In practice, the work of these 
departments is under the direct supervision of the CCP general secretary and supports the 
decision-making processes of the Politburo and its Standing Committee.  
                                                 
54 Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China:  From Revolution Through Reform, Second Edition (New 
York:  W.W. Norton and Company, 2004), 174. 
55 Ibid., 175. 
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b. Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee 
The first layer of the party organization that exercises an operational role 
in the national security decision-making process is the Political Bureau (Politburo or PB).  
Considered the party headquarters; it is presided over by the party general secretary and 
typically has from fourteen to twenty-four members.  Most of these members are part of 
the highest tier of party leadership and serve in multiple functions throughout the 
government.  Press reports since the 16th Party Congress in November 2002 as well as 
statements by retired Politburo members have indicated that the PB meets once each 
month for a collective discussion on issues related to the overall direction of party affairs 
in China.56  Considering the gravity of certain issues, the Politburo is the ultimate 
decision making body for certain items formally listed within the purview of lower-level 
organizations such as the Central Military Commission including “questions concerning 
war, armed force, and national defense building.”57  Additionally, the Politburo is 
authorized to appoint several thousand officials throughout the Chinese political system 
and can review the lower level appointments of several thousand more.58    
While the Politburo, in theory, is overall in charge of all functions of the 
political-military system and has the constitutional power to make all decisions, this body 
is still too large to be adequately responsive in handling more everyday or crisis-related 
decisions that require quick responses and flexibility.  Therefore, in truth, the smaller 




                                                 
56 Alice L. Miller, “Hu Jintao and the Party Politburo,” China Leadership Monitor 9 (2004):  6.  
http://www.hoover.org/publications/clm/issues/2904576.html (accessed November 09, 2009). 
57 Yao Yanjin et al., eds., Junshi Zuzhi Tizhi Yanjiu (Beijing: Guofang Daxue Chubanshe, 1997),  371 
as cited in David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military:  Progress, Problems, and Prospects 
(Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press, 2002), 112. 
58 Alice L. Miller, “Party Politburo Processes Under Hu Jintao,” Chinese Leadership Monitor 11 
(2004):  4.  http://www.hoover.org/publications/clm/issues/2904176.html (accessed November 09, 2009). 
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security decision-making process in the PRC.59  In most issues of importance, the 
Politburo procedures “essentially ratify initiatives that the Politburo Standing Committee 
generates.”60 
The nine members of the PBSC meet at least weekly to make substantial 
foreign and domestic policy decisions through consensus.  As one former Politburo 
member once pointed out, however, this consensus61 (in both the PB as well as PBSC 
meetings) takes into special account the positions of the members most affected by the 
decision as well as the connections and prominence of the members on any particular side 
of a debate.62  As former Chinese diplomat Lu Ning remarked, if the membership 
becomes deadlocked over an issue, the meeting is recessed and a series of informal 
sessions and discussions among the membership and their respective advisory staff are 
pursued until a unified proposal can be submitted for approval in a formal session.63   
When a security-related problem first emerges, the PBSC takes the lead 
and with the aid of the CCP General Office, attempts to get a precursory handle on the 
issue.64  As is normally the case when a group of career professionals with diverse 
backgrounds are assembled, there are those in the room that have more specialized 
education, experience, or interest in a particular issue than others in the group.  As the 
PBSC begins to assess the situation, these issue-specific professionals take a central part 
in the ongoing decision process.  In the case of a crisis, a single member of the PBSC will 
be given the lead on coordinating the proposal and will assume the responsibility as crisis 
manager for the respective issue.65  With this position of authority comes the ability to 
assemble a crisis action team of leaders that will meet at the crisis manager’s office 
                                                 
59 John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, Imagined Enemies:  China Prepares for Uncertain War 
(Stanford, CA:  Stanford University Press, 2006), 80. 
60 Miller, “Hu Jintao and the Party Politburo,” 7. 
61 Lu Ning, The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China, Second Edition (Boulder, CO:  
Westview Press, 2000), 19. 
62 Based on remarks by Hu Qiaomu on 20 April 1989 as cited by Miller, “Hu Jintao and the Party 
Politburo,” 5–6. 
63 Lu, The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China, 19. 
64 Lewis and Xue, Imagined Enemies, 89. 
65 Ibid., 90. 
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throughout the crisis to analyze the situation.  Throughout the process, the crisis manager 
is required to update the PBSC of developments and to develop a crisis plan of action to 
propose to the PBSC for decision.66   
The current membership of the 17th CCP Politburo Standing Committee 
in decreasing order of stature is CCP General Secretary, PRC President, and Chairman of 
the CMC Hu Jintao, National People’s Congress Standing Committee Chairman Wu 
Bangguo, PRC Premier Wen Jiabao, Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Congress (CPPCC) Jia Qinglin, Li Changchun, Executive Secretary of the 
Secretariat (likely successor to President Hu Jintao) Xi Jinping, Executive Vice Premier 
(possible successor to Premier Wen Jiabao) Li Keqiang, Chairman of the Central 
Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC) He Guoqiang, and Zhou Yongkang.   
As listed above, there are no professional military members on the PBSC.  
Although this demonstrates the transition to increasingly civilian-oriented control of the 
military apparatus, it also points to the increased importance of the Central Military 
Commission (discussed in more depth below) when advising the central leadership on 
national security matters.  Additionally, professional military members, although not 
formally seated in PBSC meetings, are present in the leadership small groups and 
handling President Hu’s attention in other critical forums.  Despite being represented 
solely by Hu Jintao in the PBSC, the PLA remains a very powerful part of the process. 
c. Secretariat, CCP General Office, Central Policy Research Office 
The “working body” of the Politburo and the PBSC is the Secretariat.67  
Headed by six powerful members of the upper leadership, this organization is responsible 
for managing the daily operations of the PBSC.  These important and decisive functions 
include “implementing their policies, administering the distribution of central-level tasks, 
and serving as the switchboard for communicating instructions from and receiving 
reports destined for the Standing Committee and the larger Politburo membership.”68  In 
                                                 
66 Lewis and Xue, Imagined Enemies, 90. 
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essence, it is the top-level information conduit between the central leadership and the 
other institutions of the organization.  Although this body’s official purview in the overall 
scheme of the PRC is limited to running party affairs,69 and it “has never played a 
decisionmaking role in foreign affairs,”70  its operational impact expands throughout the 
top organs of power in party, military, and state.  Not only does it channel and frame the 
information that goes before the Politburo and the PBSC, but it also shapes outcomes as it 
generates operational orders from the more general policy decisions of the higher-level 
decision-making meetings.  Due to the executive secretary of the Secretariat being a 
member of the PBSC as well as the close institutional ties that join the Secretariat and the 
Standing Committee, the best way to understand their relationship is to see them as 
partners in the same mission.71  The current membership of the Secretariat will serve 
until 2012 and includes Executive Secretary Xi Jinping, Director of the Propaganda 
Department Liu Yunshan, Director of the Organization Department Li Yuanzhao, Deputy 
Secretary of CDIC He Yong, Director of the Central Committee Policy Research Office 
Wang Huning, and the Director of the General Office Ling Jihua. 
A second critical component of the party’s staff system that plays an 
instrumental role in decision making is the CCP General Office.  This institution manages 
the communications and staff documents for top-level meetings, administers travel, 
arranges living accommodations, and provides workspace and personal security for high-
level officials.  As long-time analyst of Chinese politics Alice Miller has observed, “the 
critical nature of the functions performed by the General Office on behalf of the Party 
leadership makes its staffing more politically sensitive than that of any of the other 
departments.”72  Due to the highly informed and inherently powerful position of Director 
of the General Office, it is necessary that the party general secretary appoint a trusted 
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staffer to the position (as was witnessed at the 17th Party Congress in October 2007 when 
Hu Jintao chose Ling Jihua, his personal secretary, to manage the organization). 
A third instrumental staff position within the party apparatus is the Policy 
Research Office which is responsible for coordinating research and issue-specific 
specialist briefings to support central leadership decision-making forums.  Wang Huning, 
a well-known college debate champion and holdover from the Jiang Zemin leadership, 
currently serves as the director of the department and member of the Secretariat.   
d. Leadership Small Groups 
The overall business of the CCP is functionally divided into critical areas 
of responsibility, each headed by a member or members of the PB or the PBSC.73  An 
institution of functionally focused “leading small groups” was used by Mao from the 
1950s until the Cultural Revolution and was resurrected by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s 
as a way to “reorganize and invigorate the nation’s policymaking system.”74 These 
specialized leading groups (lingdao xiaozu) coordinate policy implementation in multiple 
organizations and institutions, cutting across the party, state, and military bureaucracies 
to increase inter-departmental action.  Although there is a lack of intimate knowledge of 
these groups due to the scant coverage they receive in the Chinese press or official 
leadership statements, below are some basic insights. 
There is a variety of kinds of leading small groups (LSG) which can 
usefully be sorted by who appointed and supervises the group, by whether the group is 
permanent or temporarily established, and by the seniority of the group’s membership.75  
There are leading groups in the party, the military, and the state structures of the 
government at all levels of the system.  The most important LSGs in CCP politics are a 
small number of permanent groups that were long ago established by the Central 
Committee.  These groups report directly to the PB or PBSC, often include many officials 
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from these high-level organizations in their membership, and are heavily relied upon to 
handle special issues within the decision-making process including jurisdiction over 
national security problems (refer to Table 2 for a list of the current primary leading 
groups and their respective leadership).76   
Table 2.   Primary Leading Groups under Hu Jintao 
  
  (From:  Miller, “Leading Small Groups,” 6.) 
When a crisis occurs, the PBSC takes the lead and is the first decision-
making body that is briefed of the situation.  As mentioned above, typically a member of 
the PBSC that is linked with the particular issue in question is assigned the central role of 
crisis manager.  The crisis manager then selects the other specialists in the various 
bureaucracies of the party, state, and military hierarchies that are needed in a nuclear 
group that will review the issue and propose a solution to the PBSC and PB for a 
consensus decision.  It is at this point that the mechanism of the LSG comes into play, as 
the crisis manager activates these specialized instruments to collect and analyze 
information on the issue at hand.  In addition to increasing the chances of creative 
problem solving by having the most authoritative experts focused on the same issue 
together, this structure allows crisis managers and other senior leadership figures to 
spread the overall responsibility of the decision among a larger group of individuals.77   
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Most of the time, complex issues confronting the central leadership do not 
simply fall into any one subject area.  An international crisis, for example, will likely 
require the expertise of the foreign affairs leading group as well as the national security 
leading group and possibly others.  In these cases, the importance of maintaining formal 
boundaries among leading groups is secondary to collectively accomplishing the mission 
at hand.  LSGs carry the authority to cut across institutional boundaries to achieve overall 
cooperation.  They are the action centers of the entire organization when confronting 
complex problems that require senior level attention and serve in this capacity from the 
beginning to the end of the conflict.78  However, as can be imagined, forcing a variety of 
unique institutions to unite to find a common solution is an objective that can be 
problematic in execution despite centrally-delegated authorities.   
The CCP LSGs also serve as a model for the creation of other small 
groups in the various bureaucracies and individual institutions at lower levels throughout 
the government.  Often labeled as “contingency teams” (yingji xiaozu), these groups 
serve as the grass-roots origins of situational information, special intelligence, ideas, and 
proposals as various staffs strive to meet the task of informing their respective senior 
leaders at the higher levels in more prominent leading groups.79  As a way to ensure that 
quality contingency teams are being assembled and acceptable inputs are being 
formulated at these various levels, the party has provided three guiding principles to 
follow:  inputs must conform to the national interest as articulated by the central 
leadership, must promote justice according to the laws of the PRC, and must “be accepted 
by the ordinary people.”80  Although these guidelines are vague, they demonstrate a 
concerted effort by the central leadership to encourage and utilize the LSG as the basic 
decision-making mechanism in crisis management.  
                                                 
78 Lewis and Xue, Imagined Enemies, 92. 
79 Ibid., 93. 
80 Ibid., 94. 
 37
2. Military Decision-Making Apparatus 
In addition to the Party, a second bureaucratic hierarchy that figures prominently 
into the national security decision-making process is the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA).  Despite some adjustments that have been made over the last few decades in force 
size and command, control, and communication (C3) procedures in order to match the 
evolving needs of modern warfare, “the organizational structure of the PLA today 
remains essentially that of the Soviet model imported during the 1950s.”81  This structure 
is headed by a Central Military Commission (CMC), chaired by the Party General 
Secretary Hu Jintao.  Although China technically has two CMCs (one for the party and 
one for the state legislature as established by the PRC constitution), since the membership 
of the two are exactly the same, the party CMC remains the primary instrument of power 
over the operations of the military (the state legislature only controls the budget which 
even then is a euphemism since the membership of the NPC and the State Council are 
also senior leaders in the party and derive their authority from the Chinese people through 
the care of the CCP).  Understanding the CMC and PLA structure and process of decision 
making is vital to predicting the interests and behavior of the Chinese military in crisis.   
a. Central Military Commission 
According to the Chinese National Defense Law, the PLA is primarily 
responsible for China’s external defense and secondarily required to provide domestic 
security in accordance with the PRC constitution under the leadership of the CMC.82  The 
CMC, under the guidance of the single highest ranking member of the CCP and the ten 
highest ranking officers in the Chinese military, commands the strategy, operations, and 
tactics the Chinese military and paramilitary forces (including the PLA, the People’s 
Armed Police (PAP), and the public militia) and determines all PRC national defense 
policies.  Although the PRC state council assists the CMC on issues involving use of the 
military for domestic security missions, and the Ministry of National Defense (MND) is 
included in the formal bureaucratic structure of the PLA, these bodies serve principally as 
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advisory bodies to the CMC in military affairs responsible for articulating national 
defense policies rather than unilaterally making national security decisions. 
The current membership of the CMC is Chairman Hu Jintao, two Vice 
Chairmen Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, state councilor and Minister of National Defense 
Liang Guanglie, Head of the General Staff Department (GSD) Chen Bingde, Head of the 
General Political Department (GPD) Li Jinai, Head of the General Logistics Department 
(GLD) Liao Xilong, Commander of the Second Artillery strategic missile force (SAF) 
Jing Zhiyuan, Commander of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Wu Shengli, 
and Commander of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) Xu Qiliang.83  The 
decisions of the CMC are implemented through the coordination and guidance of four 
specialized and critically important departments.  Each of these departments has its 
equivalent components in the lower levels of the military structure including each 
service, military educational institution, each of the seven military region headquarters, 
and even in each brigade or regiment level.  This structure is illustrated in Figure 3 and is 
described in detail below. 
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Figure 3.   People’s Liberation Army Command Structure                                              
(From:  David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military, 111.) 
b. Departments 
The General Staff Department (GSD) organizes and commands military 
operations and is responsible for “operations, intelligence, electronic warfare, 
communications, military affairs, training, mobilization, meteorological and survey, 
cartographic functions, and foreign affairs for the entire PLA.”84  It is the senior 
department of the four and serves as the service headquarters for the Chinese army.  
During peacetime, most of the GSD functions are administrative and routine as it serves 
as the overall quality control mechanism for military readiness.  During crisis “it 
supervises all theater operations and control’s the nation’s combat forces at and above the 
corps (jun) level and air and naval units at the division (shi) level.”85   
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GSD has standing orders from the CMC that in the case of a crisis that 
could result in war, it is to convene a leading group of senior officers in all specialties, 
services, and regions at the Operations Department command center to formulate battle 
plans.86  During this process, the GSD often supports this military leading group with 
other small groups consisting of military strategists and foreign military analysts from the 
nation’s academic institutions and think-tanks.  Two of these groups, the Strategic 
Committee and the International Situation Research Team, are formal institutions under 
the control of the GSD that are routinely used in military crisis planning.  “In reaching its 
decision, the CMC relies more on the two units than any other research groups.”87  At the 
heart of GSD and serving overall situational awareness cell for the CMC is the 
Operations Bureau 24-hour watch.88  Additionally, the GSD also oversees the operations 
of all the PLA’s nuclear forces with only the CMC chairman having the authority to 
launch nuclear weapons (only after getting the agreement of the other members of the 
CMC and the Politburo).89  Likely for purposes of strategic control and deterrence, the 
nuclear forces of the Second Artillery are exceptional in that they are under the direct 
operational control of the CMC.   
The General Political Department (GPD) administers, organizes, and 
oversees the political work of the Chinese armed forces.  Due to the PLA being first and 
foremost a party-army, the doctrine of the CCP has always been coupled closely with the 
discipline and policies of the PLA.  The GPD functions as a monitoring device and 
second channel of information about the internal operations and compliance of military 
personnel that serves to strengthen the penetrative reach of the CCP, Politburo, and CMC.    
The GPD functions through the use of political commissars at the regiment level and 
above and party cells with unit leaders below the regiment level.  National-level political 
guidance is passed from Beijing to the various party committees in each level all the way 
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to the individual units.  Unit leaders then insure that all personnel understand and comply 
with party political guidance throughout the organization.    Although one source from 
1990 claimed that commissars at all levels are equivalent in rank to the senior military 
commander at the same level,90 GSD regulations published in an internal PLA document 
state that the headquarters with its operational commander “is the only organ in the PLA 
that has command authority.”91  As one China analyst has pointed out, this seems to 
indicate that at least during times of war, the operational military commander is senior to 
the commissar at his respective level of responsibility.92 
The remaining two departments, while being critically important to the 
overall mission and operations of the PLA, are less of a factor in the national security 
decision-making process during a crisis.  The General Logistics Department (GLD), as 
the name implies, is a support department responsible for the finances and accounting, 
transportation, supply, construction, and personnel services.  The General Armaments 
Department (GAD) is a recent addition to the four (founded in 1998) that is responsible 
for providing weapons and technology to the PLA.  It overseas research, development, 
and acquisition programs across China’s industrial sector as well as from companies 
abroad.  As stated previously, these four departments are directed by the CMC and 
together serve as the backbone of the Chinese military. 
c. Military Services and Educational Institutes 
Following the four departments in precedence, there are five services in 
the PLA that constitute the operational capabilities of the military.  These are the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), the 
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People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), the Second Artillery Force (SAF),93 and 
the People’s Armed Police (PAP).  Since Hu Jintao’s appointment as chairman of the 
CMC in September 2004, this decision-making body was expanded to include the senior 
officer in each of these services so that each of these institutions now has direct military 
representation at the highest level—a move generally regarded as an effort to increase 
overall jointness and unity of effort across all services.  It also demonstrates an effort to 
adapt to the needs of modern warfare by elevating the importance of capabilities in the air 
and on the sea in addition to on the ground—a movement away from the strictly army-
centric mentality of the past.  The basic mission of each service is familiar to anyone with 
a basic knowledge of military science, tactics, and hardware and is not included in this 
study, which is focused on an analysis of the national security decision-making process.  
Each service has its unique institutional capabilities and institutional identities as 
commonly seen in professional militaries elsewhere in the world.  Each service uses its 
resources according to acceptable rules of engagement in order to accomplish its 
individual objectives and consequently the overall mission.94 
There are three military educational institutes that provide specialized 
training and academic research to support the mission of the PLA.  These are the 
Academy of Military Sciences (AMS), the National Defense University (NDU), and the 
National Defense Science and Technology University (NUDT).  These formal institutes 
are not to be compared with the Strategic Committee and the International Situation 
Research Team discussed above.  These are not permanent academic small groups under 
the direction of the GSD but rather are sizable, professional military academic 
organizations under the direct control of the CMC.  Of these three institutions, the AMS, 
located in northwest Beijing, is the premier research and development center for the PLA 
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Carl H. Builder, Masks of War (Baltimore:  Rand Corporation/John Hopkins Press, 1991).  
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and the foremost body for “the study of military strategy, operations, and tactics; military 
systems; military history; and foreign militaries.”95  Scholars from all of these institutions 
serve to inform the central leadership of the Politburo, the PBSC, as well as the CMC and 
its subordinate bodies.  Professionals from these academies can be regularly appointed to 
aid crisis management teams with expert knowledge and strategic reflection. 
d. Regional Headquarters 
China is divided into seven military regions (refer to Figure 4).  Each 
military region (MR) is named for the city where its headquarters is located.   
 
   
 
Figure 4.   Chinese Military Regions and Fleets                                                               
(From:  Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military, 147.) 
Each region is organized as a “theater of war” (zhanqu) and is designed to 
be the focus of operational warfare to confront potential crises that could arise in each 
respective zone.  During a crisis, the CMC has direct control over each region through the 
                                                 
95 Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, 31. 
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GSD and its Operations Department.  In the case of a military crisis that is estimated to 
have the potential to escalate into war, the CMC through the GSD can be expected to 
establish operational control (and tactical control in the case of the strategic missile 
forces) by forming a theater joint command at the regional headquarters, advance 
command posts, and a group of senior military commanders to relay situational 
information and CMC directives between Beijing and the conflict zone.96 
Each regional headquarters shares an organizational structure similar to 
that of the national military level, with the regional elements of each of the four 
functional departments and each military service at the regional level under the command 
of the MR party committee (consisting of the MR commander, the MR political 
commissar, MR chief of staff, and several deputy commanders) as depicted in Figure 5. 
  
 
Figure 5.   Military Region Structure                                                                         
(After:  Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, 34.)  
e. Tactical Headquarters 
Continuing the same theme of organization, subordinate to each MR 
command are tactical headquarters, which serve as the basic military units in the 
structure.  Three to four specialized squads (ten to twelve soldiers) led by 
noncommissioned officers make up platoons which are commanded by a junior officer 
                                                 
96 Lewis and Xue, Imagined Enemies, 124. 
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(typically forty personnel total).97  Three or four platoons make up a company 
commanded by an army captain and a political instructor.  Three to five companies make 
up a battalion commanded by a lieutenant colonel, political instructor, deputy 
commander, and a medical officer.98   
Regiments (composed of three battalions or from 1,000 to 2,500 
personnel) and brigades (composed of three to five battalions or from 2,000 to 6,000 
personnel) are the first headquarters that are organized around a combined arms team 
with the support of the four functional departments.99  Regiments and brigades are 
viewed as having the same function and are organized the same way (see Figure 6).  
These tactical headquarters are commanded by a colonel and a political commissar with 
the aid of a deputy commander, deputy commissar, and a chief of staff.100   
 
Figure 6.   Tactical Headquarters Structure                                                                    
(After:  Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, 40.) 
Administratively, divisions are typically composed of three regiments 
(totaling 10,000 personnel).  A difference from the PRC military structure and other 
                                                 
97 Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, 36–7. 
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professional militaries is that operationally, brigades are seen as equivalent to divisions 
and are not commanded by divisional headquarters.101  A division is commanded by a 
senior colonel and commissar with the aid of a deputy commander, deputy commissar, 
chief of staff, and staff organization similar in structure but larger in size than a regiment.  
Operationally, organized group armies consist of various arrangements of divisions, 
regiments, and brigades assembled to confront a certain mission (typically numbering 
from 30,000 to 50,000 personnel).102  A MR headquarters controls multiple group armies 
and other various tactical units commiserate with the demands of its specific mission.      
3. State Foreign Affairs Apparatus 
While the decision-making power resides ultimately with the party, and the PLA 
wields coercive military power, the state institutions of law and foreign affairs also play a 
critical role in crisis decision making. 
 
Figure 7.   State Government Foreign Affairs Structure103 
                                                 
101 Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, 41. 
102 Ibid., 43. 
103 Much of the information depicted in Figure 7 is from Lu Ning’s account of the PRC state structure. 
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a. National People’s Congress 
The National People’s Congress (NPC) is the legislative equivalent of the 
National Party Congress (though less powerful) and is presided over by PRC President 
Hu Jintao and Vice President Xi Jinping.  Consisting of over three thousand delegates, 
the membership of the NPC is elected each four years and meets once every year to 
review major policy initiatives and revise Chinese state constitutional law.  Although the 
NPC is far from being free of the influence of the party (the majority of members are also 
ranking CCP members), the body’s overall influence within the Chinese government and 
plethora of institutional capabilities has steadily increased since the reforms of Deng 
Xiaoping (initiated in the late 1970s and early 1980s), at times even managing to stall 
major party initiatives.104  The NPC has taken measures to adopt law and sponsor a 
system of courts—a process that still has much room for improvement.105  It has also 
served a leading role in the institutional reforms that have characterized much of the past 
three decades, presiding over a plethora of individual organizations from the highest to 
the lowest levels of the Chinese state and including bureaucracies focused on everything 
from finances, economics, and trade to the environment, agriculture, education, science, 
culture, health, law, and—of most importance to this study—foreign affairs and research. 
To better supervise this body’s operations between sessions, the NPC 
selects a small group of senior leaders to represent its interests in the National People’s 
Congress Standing Committee.  This smaller body is able to meet more frequently 
throughout the year and remains tightly connected with the other high-level organs of 
power including the CCP Politburo and PBSC.  The chairman of the National People’s 
Congress Standing Committee is Wu Bangguo who presides over a group of fifteen vice 
chairmen and a secretary general.  Of note, Wu is the number two leader in the PBSC, the 
most powerful decision-making body in China.   
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b. State Council 
One of the responsibilities of the NPC is to elect a State Council that is 
responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the state government institutions.  The State 
Council is currently presided over by PRC Premier Wen Jiabao, four vice premiers—
including Executive Vice Premier Li Keqiang (likely Wen’s chosen successor), Vice 
Premier of Agriculture Hui Liangyu, Vice Premier for Industry and Energy Zhang 
Dejiang, and Vice Premier of Finance Wang Qishan—and five state councilors including 
Minister of National Defense Liang Guanglie, Minister of Foreign Affairs Dai Bingguo, 
Minister of Public Security Meng Jianzhu, Minister of Education, Science and 
Technology, and the Private Sector Liu Yandong, and State Council Secretary General 
Ma Kai.  Through this collection of senior executives, the State Council supervises an 
expansive organization that reaches all the way to the local township and covers a wide 
variety of issue areas.   
PRC Premier Wen Jiabao is most focused on maintaining the economic 
growth needed in China while many of the foreign policy issues related to national 
security are kept within the domain of Party General Secretary Hu Jintao.  As for foreign 
affairs decision making, the principal group with the power to determine Chinese action 
is the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG).  As discussed above in the leading 
small group section, Hu Jintao presides over this permanent leading group and acquires 
through other senior leaders the resources needed from all the relevant bureaucratic 
institutions of state, party, and military—thereby, exercising trans-departmental 
authorities to coordinate efforts on specific issues.  However, the state government has a 
prominent role in this process as well since the FALSG relies upon the Central Foreign 
Affairs Office for its staffing, information, and special expertise—all resources 
principally provided by the General Office of the State Council under the direction of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.106  
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c. Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is the principal government 
channel for collecting, processing, and disseminating information on issues related to 
foreign governments and—despite multiple changes in structure and authorities—remains 
home to the most important institutional capabilities in foreign affairs available to central 
governmental decision makers.  The MFA, although administratively subordinate to the 
State Council, operationally reports directly to the PBSC through the FALSG (both 
currently managed by PRC President Hu Jintao).107  The MFA is a large bureaucracy 
with over 3,201 members.108  Its total structure (including elements not illustrated in 
Figure 7) includes the Foreign Affairs General Office, the Foreign Affairs Management 
Department, eight departments focused on the MFA’s internal affairs, and sixteen 
departments focused on China’s external affairs (including both regional and functional 
departments).109 The MFA is currently headed by Minister Yang Jiechi who has a 
doctorate degree in history and an extensive career record of handling Sino-American 
foreign affairs.  His experience includes having served in the PRC embassy in the United 
States as a staffer and minister, as the head of the MFA Department of North American 
and Oceania Affairs, and most recently as Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of China to 
the United States of America from 2001 to 2005.  His career progression to the foremost 
position in the MFA demonstrates, in part, the high priority placed on managing Chinese 
affairs with the United States.110  Although the size and span of the institutional 
capabilities administered by the MFA is often under-appreciated in studies of Chinese 
national security decision making, this body plays a significant role in informing, 
framing, and implementing the overall outcome of crisis decisions.   
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The MFA is the primary information channel for the overall decision-
making structure and a foremost implementer of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic 
contact.  As the senior department of the MFA, the Foreign Affairs General Office 
supervises the work of the Confidential Communications Bureau (responsible for all 
diplomatic communications) and the Confidential Traffic Division (responsible for the 
exchange of classified information in hard copy).111  It also oversees the operations of the 
Foreign Affairs Secretariat (responsible for maintaining a 24 hour Situation Room watch 
as well as providing critical staff to high-ranking ministers and other central offices such 
as the Central Foreign Affairs Office which staffs the FALSG).112  The MFA includes 
departments devoted to handling issues arising in specific regions (including the 
approximately thirty personnel assigned to handle United States-specific problems) or 
within specific functional domains (including processing information from Chinese 
missions abroad).  The basic listing provided here is only a small portion of the total 
resources available to the foreign affairs bureaucracy.  In addition, since many issues in 
foreign relations in some way involve economics and commerce, the MFA often 
coordinates with the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC).  
It also makes use of the state-controlled Xinhua media agency to receive both unfiltered 
information of current events and researched foreign analysis products as well as to send 
official messages on state policies to the viewing public. 
C. SUMMARY 
The PRC structure detailed in this chapter demonstrates the applicability of the 
cybernetic approach as delineated in Chapter II in the following ways: 
 The Chinese government is intensely hierarchical and is arranged in key 
vertical conduits of action along the lines of its principal institutions (CCP, 
PLA, State Council) each with unique tasks, capabilities, and routines. 
 Each vertical conduit is equipped with ample chokepoints where staff offices 
and secretarial personnel can screen and shape the issues that get top attention. 
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 There is a tendency from the highest levels to the lowest levels of the 
government structure for decision makers to select an appropriate course of 
action in collective groups rather than as stand-alone figures accepting all 
responsibility for the outcome. 
 Despite using the LSG as a cross-institution coordination mechanism, these 
institutional hierarchies (“stovepipes”) can be expected at times to restrict 
communication and prevent optimal cooperation during crisis management. 
 The structure changes very gradually and incrementally, at times going years 
without dramatic alteration then undergoing significant shifts in structure (an 
example of this was the recent creation of the GAD in response to lack of 
coordination among industry groups and the need to improve the PLA).  
Now that this study has established the foundations of the cybernetic model as 
well as the PRC structure and process, it turns to testing PRC politics to determine the 
applicability of the cybernetic approach in explaining Beijing’s behavior.  
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IV. TEST #1:  CURRENT TRENDS IN PRC POLITICS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This study now turns its attention to the first of two tests that will illustrate the 
applicability of the cybernetic approach in explaining and predicting Beijing’s behavior.  
Since Deng Xiaoping’s consolidation of power in the CCP in 1978, the country has 
implemented a series of wide-ranging reforms in its economic, social, military, and 
political structures.  Some of these trends have advanced to great degrees in the last 
decade under the governance of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao and reveal critical insights 
into Beijing’s decision-making process and the changing climate of Chinese politics.  
This chapter analyzes current trends that continue to shape Chinese politics through a 
lens of the three key functional variables described in Chapter II.  This test proves that 
despite much emphasis in China-centered scholarship on viewing the PRC’s strategic 
goals as key indicators of Beijing’s rational decision making, ongoing changes in Chinese 
politics illustrate that a cybernetic-style process is at work.  
B. CHINA MANAGING COMPLEXITY 
Certain political trends including a focus on institutionalizing the system, the 
development of a repertoire of professional institutions and individuals with specialized 
expertise and routines, and a crucial attention on only a limited number of issues that can 
potentially threaten the survival of the organization have collectively allowed Beijing to 
manage the increasing complexity of its decision-making environment.  
1. Institutionalization 
The political reforms largely initiated under the guidance of Deng Xiaoping 
beginning at the 1978 Third Plenum began a deliberate, incremental effort within the 
senior leadership of the CCP to institutionalize Chinese politics—to establish a 
predictable system governed by accepted, legal norms of behavior and routines of 
operation.  This drive to institutionalize the Chinese political system has been attributed 
to two primary motivations.  First, Deng’s ascension to the highest-ranking position of 
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power in the CCP was completed in tandem with a shift in national priorities away from 
the Mao-era focus on social revolution and national security to a new program centered in 
national growth through economic development and modernization—new priorities 
accompanied by a wide range of new challenges and the need for a stable political 
environment.  Secondly, following the erratic, disruptive policies initiated by the central 
leadership of Mao Zedong that had at times halted economic development and held the 
entire political system hostage to the whims of a single leader and his core elite, Deng 
and the new senior leadership cadre were determined to bring institutional change to the 
CCP and other organs of power within the Chinese government that would result in 
increased productivity, transparency, dependability, and accountability of the leadership 
decision-making processes.113 As explained by Deng following similar if only short-lived 
institutional changes that were adopted in the late 1950s, the demands of the increasingly 
complex environment in China proved to be more than the archaic leadership structures 
could handle, forcing the CCP to recognize the need for improved organizational 
responsibilities, authorities, and institutionalized procedures.114  Although 
institutionalization can be broadly defined to include a plethora of organizational 
identities and cultural tendencies, here the term is applied more specifically to two 
prevalent trends within the Chinese system:  the shift to increased collective leadership 
processes and the fragmentation of decision-making responsibilities both horizontally and 
vertically among an increased number of political actors.     
a. Collective Leadership 
The current trend in Chinese leadership decision making has been away 
from the role of a paramount leader and the monopoly of power among a few elite cadre 
at the center toward an increasingly collective process where decisions arise out of the 
consensus of larger groups of party members.  Although China is still led by a self-
elected group of elite party leaders, the highest ranking leader has less power over his 
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colleagues than in previous administrations.  Decisions now result from collective 
discussions where the party general secretary is only the senior member of the group 
whose opinion, although very important, cannot override the opinions of the others.115   
Since Deng’s emphasis on reinvigorating collective leadership processes 
in order to better handle complex issues facing China in the late 1970’s, there has been a 
progressive movement to greater political collectivization rather than a reversion to the 
old centralized leadership decisions of Mao.  Deng strongly argued against the dictatorial 
style of leadership of Mao and his “cult of personality” in a 1980 speech “On Reform of 
the System of Party and State Leadership” and instead stressed that the top levels of 
leadership must be based in greater equality in the decision-making process.116  In 1989 
during the transition to Jiang Zemin, Deng remarked that “if your leading body is going 
to succeed, it is essential for you to form a collective leadership … a collective in which 
each member cooperates closely with the others, and a collective that thinks 
independently … you should complement each other’s thinking and help correct each 
other’s mistakes and shortcomings.”117 
Deng’s successor, Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin, continued this 
trend, emphasizing in his Central Committee report to both the 15th Party Congress 
(1997) and the 16th Party Congress (2002) the importance of maintaining principles of 
collective decision making at the top levels of the party and state as well as extending 
these practices to party committees at lower levels.118  Jiang’s successor and current 
leader of China, Hu Jintao, has further advanced the concept of collective leadership both 
in word and deed by emphasizing over the past decade the importance of intra-party 
democracy and “scientific” decision-making processes that focus on the strengths of 
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collective decision making in handling complex issues currently facing the PRC.119  Hu 
has also been the first leader to not be formally labeled as the individual genesis of 
specific ideas or to be titled China’s “core” or “central” leader—preferring instead to be 
seen as the senior member of a collective leadership group.  Systemically, there is now a 
greater tolerance than ever before for constructive debate among leaders in party, 
military, and state organs of power and decision making.    
Collective leadership practices, seen through a cybernetic approach, 
demonstrate a tendency to solve complex problems by relying on the strengths of 
multiple actors within the organization rather than through the unitary goals and rational 
action of a single leader.  Collective leadership is the accepted norm of behavior within 
the decision-making forum that allows more actors to bring additional insight to the 
process and spreads the responsibility for decision outcomes among a larger group of 
individuals and institutions. 
b. Fragmentation 
Another aspect of this expanding political space includes the 
fragmentation of decision-making responsibilities into the hands of other individuals and 
institutions not previously included in the central leadership group.  This can occur 
horizontally as other high-ranking leadership bodies are endowed with increased 
authority and responsibility for selecting or advising appropriate outcomes.  Authority 
can also be fragmented vertically as the central leadership delegates decision-making 
responsibilities up or down the chain of command in order to better select and implement 
a suitable course of action.  Both of these tendencies highlight the organizational nature 
of Chinese politics and are noticeably present in Beijing’s national security and foreign 
policy decision-making processes. 
(1)  Pluralization.  As described above, pluralization is the 
dispersal of responsibilities within the other institutions that share the top levels of the 
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government apparatus.  Most notably, in China this includes the top tiers of the military 
and state hierarchies.  Over the past decade, the CCP under Hu Jintao has made a 
concerted effort to expand the scope of the institutions that are represented in the central 
leadership meetings.  Although, as one veteran scholar has remarked, the inclusion of 
additional political actors in the process has been “licensed” by the central government in 
the effort of promoting reform without sacrificing control of the political domain, this 
tendency has nevertheless affected the nature of the decision-making process.120 
One notable indication of pluralization is the heavy use of the 
informal LSG mechanism for handling a variety of significant issues.  Currently, most 
actual decision making is completed by these issue-centric collections of key individuals 
from relevant institutions throughout the party, state, and military hierarchies.  The group 
leader (typically a member of the PBSC if not the party general secretary himself) has the 
authority to pull whatever resources that are deemed helpful or necessary to making an 
informed decision or proposal that will ultimately be subjected to the consensus of the 
larger Politburo or the PBSC for approval. 
Another indication of pluralization is the increased power of the 
military and state bureacracies.  Under the leadership of Hu Jintao and Premier Wen 
Jiabao (and arguably due in part to the closeness of their relationship), the party’s strict 
direction over the affairs of the other two hierarchies—the PLA and the state 
government—has been loosened thereby empowering both organizations to better handle 
issues arising in their respective domains and increasing the overall pluralization of the 
central government.  One veteran analyst has described these relationships as bargains 
where the CCP “provides political protection and resources in exchange for corporatist 
professionalism and allegiance.”121 
Yet another indication of increasing political pluralization is the 
increasing influence of public opinion in the central leadership decision-making process.  
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During his tenure in office, Hu Jintao has focused the government’s attention on people-
centered policies that serve the greater mass of the Chinese population.  Upon assuming 
the position of PRC president in March 2003, Hu publicly announced that his 
administration would “synthesize [the principles of] party leadership, the people being 
masters of their own country, and ruling the country according to law,” thereby indicating 
the accepted and embraced role of popular opinion in shaping the alternatives considered 
by leadership to be appropriate courses of action to pursue.122  Premier Wen echoed this 
stance at the 2003 NPC by stating that “the government will self-consciously accept the 
supervision of the People’s Congress, the masses, and the media.”123  
(2) Decentralization. Beijing also uses decentralization—the 
vertical proliferation of responsibilities—to fragment complex issues for specialized 
treatment within the governing apparatus.  In China, decentralization can occur both 
within the national-level organizations in Beijing as well as from the capital to the 
provincial level institutions.   
The role of the PBSC as the central organ of national security and 
foreign policy decision making has evolved as power has been delegated from the CCP 
Central Committee to the Politburo.  As seen in the latest two Party Congresses, the Hu 
leadership has sought to develop increased accountability and transparency into this 
particular relationship over the past decade by reestablishing a routine originally initiated 
at the 13th Party Congress in 1987 of regularly delivering reports of the Politburo’s work 
to the Central Committee, thereby setting a model of official accountability for the rest of 
the government to emulate.124 
The Hu administration has also further decentralized the system by 
authorizing lower-level bodies within the national-level governmental hierarchies to 
assume important decision-making responsibilities, resulting in many duties being 
absorbed by respective ministers of foreign and economic policy and senior military 
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leaders with significantly less oversight.125  Decentralization has also been observed in 
the increased “policy space” available to the provincial leaders when interpreting 
national-level decisions in the way that best fits their specific provincial needs.  Some 
research has cited multiple instances where provinces have functioned within the often 
broad national-level mandates to conduct international business and even informal 
diplomacy on their own “in order to enhance their own international images and pursue 
their own economic interests.”126  While provincial moves that exceed the acceptable 
limits of action deemed appropriate for provincial-international affairs can be problematic 
for Beijing’s overall foreign policy, having an empowered yet cooperative provincial 
system provides an additional layer to the decision-making process that can assist the 
government in managing complexity in a cybernetic manner.        
2. Professionalization 
A second critical trend that continues to shape Chinese politics and assists Beijing 
in the management of an increasingly more complex environment is the high priority 
given to professionalism and specialization in all domains of the government structure.  
As issue-specific expertise increases, the overall capability of the government to respond 
to a wide range of problems is enhanced. 
a. Specialization 
The cybernetic approach to decision making states that outcomes are 
based in the existing institutional capabilities present in the organization.  Beijing, 
realizing the expanding scope of issues present in its current international and domestic 
environments, has restructured the collective decision-making process in a way that 
encourages and utilizes a variety of specialized, professional institutions.  As Eliot 
Freidson’s foundational analysis of state professional organizations outlines, only the 
national government has the ability through coercion (typically in the form of law and 
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bureaucratic regulation) to define an individual institution’s specialized mission and 
consequently its identity, culture, and capabilities.127  As explained by Freidson, 
depending on how the state defines these attributes will determine the degree of 
specialization the institution will entertain, the uniqueness of the institution within its 
respective area of specialty, the resources allotted to the institution to pursue its specialty, 
the institution’s degree of control over entrance into its respective domain, and the level 
of audience the institution serves with its specialized information. 
The increased emphasis on professionalization in the Chinese government 
has been seen in trends including the selection and promotion of bureaucratic elites and 
subelites with special education, experience, and institutional support within the central 
decision-making process, the creation of decision-making bodies and institutions that 
meet specific needs, and the reliance of the central leadership on specialized 
information.128  While all of the senior cadre in the Deng administration and nearly half 
of the leadership in the Jiang administration had legitimacy based in revolutionary 
credentials or lengthy party experience, the Hu administration includes a very well 
educated group of specialists with a variety of university degrees including engineering 
geology, economics, business management, military science, political science, 
philosophy, history, and law.  Only two of twenty-five top officials lack a university 
degree and instead have obtained credentials from the Central Party School.  Six of these 
individuals have doctorate degrees in their respective areas of expertise.129  During 
Politburo and PBSC meetings, issues are initially briefed and explained in detail by 
members of the group that have special expertise and training in the respective issue 
area.130  In addition, the LSG institution is frequently used to handle crises in specific 
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issue areas and frequently calls upon specialists in particular areas of interest from a 
variety of bureaucratic offices throughout the organization to provide issue-specific 
insight prior to arriving at a consensus on an appropriate response.131  Furthermore, as 
described above, bureaucracies such as the CMC and MFA have been expanded and 
reorganized in order to provide specialty personnel representing unique institutional 
capabilities and areas of interest at key decision-making meetings. 
b. Organizational Routines 
Pre-planned routines are at the heart of the cybernetic model of decision 
making.  Although these standard operating procedures (SOPs) may vary in their specific 
functions from mundane tasks such as inter-office routing procedures of correspondence 
to complex sequences of action used to respond to emergencies, they each represent an 
institutional capability existing in the organization.  SOPs are predictable and can be 
practiced in preparation for use should the appropriate situation arise.  As such, these 
sequences of action provide a repertoire of alternatives available to decision makers. 
To Deng Xiaoping, successful reform and modernization of China 
required standardized, predictable processes of decision making with the party and state 
bodies meeting on regular schedules according to their respective constitutions.  Deng 
instituted routine turnovers of the senior leadership and imposed mandatory retirements 
for aging central party members that continue to be upheld in the CCP structure.  This 
practice has continued and expanded in scope under Jiang and Hu.  In addition, central 
leadership meetings have become more regularized, since Deng with the overall climate 
of the government transitioning in favor of a more predictable system of routines rather 
than the unstable, erratic nature of central politics often exhibited under Mao.  Similarly, 
the PLA, as all professional militaries, relies heavily on SOPs to coordinate and execute 
complicated routines within each functional department and service branch extending all 
the way to the individual specialized unit on the battlefield or in the headquarters office. 
However, routines also limit the range of alternatives available from 
which decision makers can choose.  Since each unique institution establishes sequences 
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of action appropriate to meeting their own respective mission requirements, decision 
makers are choosing from a menu of pre-made options rather than custom-ordering new 
organization routines that can be enacted to deal with the current situation.  Although this 
allows the decision maker to simplify a complex problem, it also decreases the overall 
flexibility of the organization.  In order to counter this constraint, decision makers try to 
expand the existing repertoire of routines, as seen in the constant restructuring of both the 
foreign affairs and national security bureaucracies over the past three decades.  
3. Focus on Survival 
The cybernetic model dictates that the organization is primarily focused on one 
thing—survival—which is often quantified as a level of autonomy or amount of allocated 
resources.  This trait is present in all levels of the organization from the central leadership 
to the local government.  As the national-level government creates unique institutions 
with distinctly defined purposes and expectations, each of these institutions develops 
capabilities and identities that strive to accomplish its particular mission in order to insure 
its continued existence.  Similarly, each individual involved in any of these institutions 
performs his or her responsibilities in an appropriate manner according to accepted rules 
of behavior in order to insure the survival of their career. 
Since every piece of the organization is focused on survival, the limited amount of 
attention and resources available to decision makers is devoted exclusively to monitoring 
the few potential problem areas that threaten the organization’s continued existence.  By 
only focusing on a few select variables that are the most critical, the leadership prioritizes 
demands and thereby can simplify an otherwise complex situation.  Additionally, since 
all these different institutions at all levels of the government may have slightly different 
interpretations of policy that best fit their respective needs, by focusing most of its 
attention on controlling action in the domains most critical to the overall survival of the 
CCP, the central leadership is best able to remain in power. 
The CCP has always focused most of its attention on staying in power.  Although 
Deng Xiaoping instituted a wide range of economic, social, and political reforms and 
emphasized the need to open China to the trade and ideas of the outside world, he was 
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also resolute in his ideological perspective that the absolute ruling power of the CCP 
should never be compromised.  As he stated in the March 1979 address on the “four 
cardinal principles,” the Chinese government must uphold the socialist road and the 
leadership of the CCP.  In the same manner, although the current Hu administration has 
made large strides in elevating the interests of the majority of Chinese population, it has 
remained ever mindful of the governing ability of the CCP.  As Hu Jintao articulated at 
the 2004 Central Committee Resolution on Strengthening the Construction of the Party’s 
Governance Ability, the leadership’s first priority is in maintaining the absolute rule of 
the CCP.132  Although other priorities such as economic modernization and national 
sovereignty are of the utmost importance, this is ultimately due to their linkage with the 
legitimacy and longevity of the CCP’s ruling status—its survival—in China.   
C. CHINA DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTY 
The second functional variable of both the rational or cybernetic approaches is 
how the national leadership reconciles uncertainty during the decision-making process.  
As illustrated below, Beijing uses cybernetic techniques when confronting situations 
where information is incomplete and risks are high.   
1. Channeling Information 
One important cybernetic technique for minimizing the potentially paralyzing 
psychological effects of uncertainty in the decision-making process is to not try to 
calculate or compare the relative values of all alternatives but instead to simply search 
sequentially through the existing organizational capabilities for the first response option 
that meets the necessary requirements for returning the critical variable of interest to 
tolerable ranges of performance.  In order to do this, information on available alternatives 
and the relative appropriateness of each is restricted to only a few accepted feedback 
channels that monitor the specific issue—leaders will only hear a message if it 
approaches the decision-making forum from a certain source.  Often these official 
channels are part of a cybernetic servomechanism maintained by the issue-specific, 
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professionalized institution responsible for handling that particular problem area.  
Although this trait may result in the leadership not appreciating key, potentially decisive 
information available in channels outside the accepted institutional conduits, since 
decision makers are not overloaded by information from all angles, uncertainty over 
whether available information is complete and perfect or whether the chosen alternative 
is the very best alternative possible is held to a minimum throughout the process.  
Complete information, as required by the rational approach, is not necessary for action. 
Prior U.S. National Security Council Senior Director for Asian Affairs Kenneth 
Lieberthal describes three general channels information may take to reach the central 
leadership.  The first is the practice of democratic centralism where a wide array of 
alternative inputs from various senior leaders is encouraged during the assessment phase 
of the decision process (explained above as collective, consensus-driven, consultative 
decision making).  The second channel is through the various support organizations made 
up of specialized institutions that contribute to the LSG and other administrative work 
meetings prior to an issue reaching a consensus decision in the center.133  Each LSG sits 
at the apex of an extensive, multi-tiered, multi-bureaucracy support organization (xitong) 
that works to gather and process relevant information in order to give their leaders the 
knowledge that is needed to make decisions.  Often much of the actual filtering of 
information is conducted in critical offices sometimes referred to as information 
“gateways” (kou) such as the CCP General Office and Secretariat, the GSD of the CMC, 
or the Foreign Affairs General Office in the MFA where it is subjected to the scrutiny and 
judgment of an extensive network of private secretaries (mishu) that serve the individual 
needs of their leaders.134  Information is power, and therefore control of the information 
is a critical function throughout the organization that, while reducing uncertainty, shapes 
outcomes.  
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2. “Reactive” Decision Making 
According to Chinese scholar Xi Liping, Chinese decision making is unlike the 
rational processes of Western-style decision making in that instead of acting to reach 
specific goals or strategic objectives, Chinese leaders monitor the international situation 
and “make reactive decisions” based on their perceptions of critical factors.135  Although 
this use of “reactive” to describe Beijing does not intend to portray Chinese leadership as 
being unable to proactively implement reforms or take action on the international stage, it 
suggests that Beijing responds to issues—and searches for alternatives—in a more 
narrowly focused manner than rational approaches dictate is necessary. 
Additionally, when reacting to problems, China further narrows the range of 
possible decisions (and consequently minimizes uncertainty) by making non-
compensatory choices.  This means that when debating the appropriateness or 
acceptability of a certain alternative, its strength in one dimension does not make up for 
its weakness in another.  For example, if a particular course of action offers the chance to 
boost the international perception of China’s military strength and courage when facing 
up to the United States, but consequently threatens to derail economic cooperation that is 
critical to China’s modernization and ultimately the legitimacy and survival of the CCP, 
Beijing will likely not consider it and will instead look for a more appropriate option.      
D. CHINA ADAPTING TO CHANGE 
The third functional variable tested here is the manner in which Beijing adapts to 
change.  As David Shambaugh has observed in a recent study on the adaptation of the 
CCP, systemic adaptation is the key for a long life of any political party or system of 
governance.136 As new or refined information becomes available, there must be a way to 
incorporate it into the decision-making process.  As the environment changes, the 
decision-making mechanisms of China’s central government have remained flexible and 
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adaptable in order to maintain their viability.  How this continues to be accomplished yet 
again indicates the cybernetic character of Beijing’s decision-making process. 
1. Experiential Learning 
While rational decision makers change their assumptions or values based on the 
goals or strategic objectives for the future, cybernetic decision makers undergo 
experiential learning by shaping choices around lessons learned from past situations.  
The principal vehicle that propelled Deng Xiaoping into power in the late 1970s 
was a focus on practice rather than stagnant ideological objectives as the guiding 
philosophy of the CCP.  As he articulated at the 1978 11th Party Congress, the party 
should “seek truth from facts”—a clever use of a 1942 statement by Mao when 
illustrating the outdated nature of governance under the “28 Bolsheviks.”  Deng further 
emphasized through the 1978 “Practice Campaign” the importance of testing the 
applicability and legitimacy of decisions against the realities of China’s environment—
rallying his support under the slogan “practice is the sole criterion for truth.”137  In this 
context, practice is defined as the use of a certain course of action with the expectation 
built upon prior experience that it will function in a certain manner.  By shifting the focus 
from pursuing Maoist goals to doing what was proven by past use to work, Deng was 
essentially reorienting the Chinese system to adaptation through experiential learning. 
Beijing under the current Hu administration has continued to use this precept to 
guide its actions.  At a 1998 ceremony marking the twentieth anniversary of Deng’s 1978 
“Practice Campaign,” Hu commented on the central importance of scientific decision 
making that tests initiatives through practice—a theme that has throughout the past 
decade become the basis for a plethora of reforms.138  As some scholars have realized, 
China adapts to lessons learned not only from its own trial and error processes, but also in  
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its keen observations of the historical lessons of other governments including the former 
Soviet Union, former Soviet republics, and other developing nations in Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America.139  
Another strong trend in the Hu leadership is the emphasis on ruling China 
according to law.  As discussed above, the state has made great efforts over the past 
decade to develop a system of courts for enforcing the statutes of the PRC constitution.  
While overall this trend has been attributed to the desire for greater institutionalization, it 
also shows a focus on the instructive qualities of the past since law is most fundamentally 
anchored in precedent (defined as a previous situation or outcome that is considered later 
when a similar situation arises). 
2.  Incremental Change 
As described above, cybernetic decision makers look at the failure or success of 
using certain organizational capabilities or institutional routines in the past.  If an option 
worked and the organization survived the conflict (despite whether it worked the best of 
all the solutions that could have been chosen), then there often is little incentive to 
introduce major change into the system.  Consequently, change occurs only gradually or 
incrementally, slowed by institutional resistance and an overall shortage of resources.  
Only when a situation arises that proves a gross inadequacy of current organization 
capabilities will the government introduce major change to its repertoire of institutional 
routines.  Contrary to popular complaints of bureaucratic “red-tape,” incremental change 
does not necessarily mean that steady, systemic adaptation is not occurring or that the 
adaptation is not occurring under a successful strategy of adjustment.  As one well-known 
Yale scholar of incrementalism has observed, “muddling through” by taking a lot of 
small steps rather than a few big steps can bring dramatic change while allowing an 
organization to adapt with the lowest risk of inadvertently causing widespread chaos.140   
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This type of gradual change with sporadic episodes of rapid adjustment 
characterizes the Chinese mode of adaptation over the past three decades.  With the initial 
reforms of Deng Xiaoping began an incremental process of adapting to an international 
economic system by gradually expanding participation in capitalist mechanisms of 
production—a process that continued through both the Jiang and Hu administrations.  
Social reforms have occurred slowly but steadily, culminating into the current Hu focus 
on the development of a “socialist harmonious society.”  Additionally, movement from 
the centralized leadership decision-making procedures under Mao as the “paramount 
leader” to Hu’s status as “first among equals” did not occur overnight but rather through 
two decades of gradual steps.  Although intra-party democracy and the institution of 
village elections have shown progress in political reform, the CCP is careful to constrain 
the free flow of these practices for fear of rogue democratic movements among the 
populace.   
As a result of Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, the central government was 
forced to acknowledge that strong reaffirmation of CCP political dominance was needed 
and a more severe period of change to less-than-adequate institutions was initiated.  
Similarly, when the first Iraq war occurred, the incredible technological performance of 
the United States “shocked” Beijing into a realization that the PLA was significantly 
deficient in its capabilities, consequently leading to a sporadic period of rapid reform and 
modernization that interrupted an otherwise incremental process of development within 
the Chinese military.  Indeed, the entire process of reform in the past thirty years is often 
characterized as one akin to “crossing the river by feeling for stones,” again emphasizing 
the experiential and experimental nature of Chinese policy making. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter has tested current trends in Chinese politics for the presence of key 
functional variables of the cybernetic approach to decision making.  It concludes that 
China routinely and systematically uses cybernetic techniques and mechanisms in its 
national security and foreign policy decision-making processes.  Beijing manages the 
increased complexity of its current environment by increasing the scale of the 
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organization through greater institutionalization, developing collective leadership 
practices, and fragmenting problems.  It increases the scope of the organization by 
promoting professionalization and specialization to handle a variety of issues related to 
the survival of the CCP.  The Chinese leadership minimizes uncertainty when making 
decisions by being highly selective of the information that it entertains, focusing on only 
those critical issues related to its core interests, choosing the first acceptable option from 
its repertoire of capabilities, and relying on the staff components of the organization to 
channel and filter its information to better focus the limited resources and attention of 
decision makers.  Finally, Beijing adapts to change by employing experiential learning—
focusing on the lessons of past performance to determine current choices.  Change is 
incremental punctuated by sporadic episodes of large-scale, failure-induced adjustment. 
After illustrating the applicability of the cybernetic approach at the macro-level of 
Chinese decision making and political change, this study now narrows its focus in a  
second test which looks at Beijing’s behavior during five specific crisis events over the 
past decade for indications that the cybernetic approach can yet further explain Chinese 







THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 71
V. TEST #2:  PRC CRISIS CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter further narrows the focus of this study by examining Chinese 
decision making during periods of crisis in order to test the applicability of the cybernetic 
model.  Since periods of crisis are often unanticipated, the decision-making process of the 
country of interest is typically less prepared for dealing with the conflict.  This often 
results in miscommunication and even struggle between institutional hierarchies, mixed 
signals between actors, and less than perfectly coordinated outcomes—thereby offering 
the outside observer a chance to view some of the internal decision mechanisms that 
under normal circumstances might not be as easily discernible.  Crises are also of great 
relevance in international relations research since it presents high-stakes situations that, if 
mishandled, could lead to severe damage to multiple countries involved.  For both of 
these reasons, this study takes a detailed look at Beijing’s behavior during times of stress.     
B. REVIEW OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND PRC CRISIS DECISION-
MAKING LITERATURE 
By simple definition, a crisis is a situation that poses intense difficulty, trouble, or 
danger; a time when critically important decisions must be made.141  Crisis management 
includes the actions taken to contain and resolve a crisis.  Recent crisis-oriented studies 
have refined this definition to apply specifically to political-military crises in 
international relations by differentiating between what constitutes a foreign policy crisis 
in a single state as opposed to the characteristics of an international crisis between two or 
more states.  A foreign policy crisis in one state typically has three factors present:  there 
is a threat to one or more of the government’s basic values, there is a limited amount of 
time to respond to the threat, and there is a greater than normal chance of the crisis 
entering into military conflict if not successfully resolved.142  An international crisis 
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displays two other characteristics that make it therefore applicable to international 
interactions.  First, there is an observable change in the nature and intensity of 
interactions between two or more states.  Second, this shift in communication results in a 
fundamental change in the status of relationship between the conflicted states and 
ultimately an alteration of the international environmental structure.143  Since “an 
international crisis begins with a disruptive action or event that creates a foreign policy 
crisis for one or more states,” there is naturally a greater quantity of foreign policy crises 
than international crises.144   
These definitions are different, however, than those used by other scholars in the 
field and thus illustrates a significant difference in the understanding of crisis.  According 
to Charles Hermann, in addition to the characteristics mentioned above, a crisis comes as 
a surprise to national decision makers.145  This raises the question of whether a tense 
event that is foreseen (possibly a flashpoint in a long-standing disagreement between two 
countries) qualifies as a crisis.  This debate often combines with another—the differences 
between decision makers of various nations regarding the nature of crises.  What may 
constitute a crisis in the minds of decision makers in one nation may not be met with the 
same sense of surprise or urgency in the minds of decision makers in another—a fact that 
leads some scholars to debate whether some episodes of “crisis management” is really 
crisis decision making or simply normal decision making in times of non-crisis stress.146 
One of the greatest challenges in crisis research (especially in using quantitative 
methods) is the relative infrequency of international crisis events, especially in any 
particular country or region.147  A helpful way to expand the available sample size of 
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crisis events is to search for near crisis situations that, although not qualifying as full-
blown crises, allow one to observe a country’s leadership decision-making structure and 
process at work in resolving extraordinary problems (the method used in the case study 
analysis below).  A “near crisis” has been defined as “a conflict that approaches the 
intensity of an international crisis in the following way:  each involved actor perceives a 
threat to basic values and a finite time for response but not an increased probability of 
military hostilities.”148  For example, in the case of Sino-American relations, while the 
Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996 qualifies as a full-scale international crisis, the 
accidental bombing of the Chinese Belgrade embassy or the 2001 EP-3 collision incident 
are classified as near crises.  The advantage of conducting research on samples that 
include near crisis events is that there are more events over shorter, more specific time 
frames available for study.  The disadvantage of using near crises as case studies in crisis 
management is that the dynamics of a crisis are arguably different under the imminent 
threat of military conflict. 
Although several individual studies have analyzed specific crisis or near crisis 
cases in Chinese history, there have been relatively few resources that have taken a 
systematic approach to analyzing multiple events over the last decade.  This study 
recognizes the contributions of two particular works that provide a good starting point for 
anyone researching recent Chinese crises.  Michael Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng with 
Danielle Cohen have compiled and edited a helpful collection of articles in Managing 
Sino-American Crises:  Case Studies and Analysis that emerged from a 2004 conference 
on crisis management held in Beijing and includes contributions from leading American 
and Chinese scholars.  Andrew Scobell and Larry Wortzel, professors at the Army 
Strategic Studies Institute, have compiled contributions in Chinese National Security 
Decisionmaking under Stress from another conference on Chinese crisis management 
also held in 2004.  Although these compilations are limited in their scope of cases and 
approaches, they present a helpful overview of recent developments in the subject. 
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C. CASE #1:  BOMBING OF PRC EMBASSY IN BELGRADE (1999) 
1. Case Details 
On May 7, 1999, two American Air Force B-2 bombers delivered multiple (GPS)-
guided, 2,000 pound, joint direct attack munitions (JDAMs) to preset aim points in an 
office building in Belgrade as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air 
campaign against Yugoslavia.  The target had been nominated by the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) (the only target nominated by the CIA) as an enemy Serbian military 
supply headquarters and verified through two defense databases on target locations.  
However, undetected in some maps was the fact that two years prior, in 1997, the 
building had been purchased and inhabited as the PRC embassy in Belgrade.  The 
unintentional bombing resulted in the deaths of three Chinese “journalists,” twenty 
injured Chinese citizens, and extensive damage to the PRC structure. 
By the morning of May 8, Beijing had accumulated very little information on the 
incident and the extent of damages (much of this coming through open source reporting 
and telephone calls from Yugoslavian-stationed Chinese media personnel).  Through the 
MFA, the Chinese government responded harshly against what it assessed as an 
intentional attack on the sovereignty of the PRC.  The PRC media (largely state 
controlled) ran the story in gory detail and, with the aid of the central government, 
crowds of protestors began to build around the American embassy in Beijing as well as 
other American diplomatic and commercial sites in other cities in China, even being at 
times bused in by the authorities.  Most Sino-American diplomatic contacts were halted, 
American navy port calls in Chinese cities were discontinued, and scheduled Sino-
American official meetings were cancelled.  Despite multiple American apologies and 
actions that extended over the next few months, the Chinese government was slow to 
resume relations and resolve the conflict.  Finally in August 1999, a deal was reached that 
compensated both countries for damages incurred and after a meeting between PRC 
President Jiang Zemin and American President Clinton at an Asian economic conference, 
relations were fully restored. 
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Although several American analysts including Kurt Campbell, Richard Weitz, 
Paul Godwin, and former deputy assistant secretary of state for relations with China 
Susan Shirk (stationed in Beijing at the time of the attack and intimately involved in the 
crisis management efforts to defuse the conflict) have offered insightful accounts of the 
crisis, due to the opacity of meetings of the Chinese central leadership, few inside details 
are available for analysis of the actual Chinese decision-making process.  One account 
that has provided the most in the form of a detailed analysis of the Chinese government 
side of this event comes from Professor Wu Baiyi, a prominent scholar on European 
studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.  His account along with other details 
illustrates strong cybernetic tendencies within the central leadership process.   
2. Case Analysis:  Managing Complexity 
During this crisis, the supreme decision-making body was the PBSC and the 
larger Politburo, which met multiple times over the course of the conflict.  Since several 
of the initial meetings were conducted as emergency meetings, it is likely that the central 
organ of power was the PBSC headed by Party General Secretary and PRC President 
Jiang Zemin.  When Vice President Hu Jintao addressed the Chinese public on May 10, 
he highlighted the collective nature of the central government decision-making process 
by encouraging the protestors to “unite closely around the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China with comrade Jiang Zemin at the core.”149  These meetings 
were collective decision-making efforts where decision was based on consensus and 
institutional routine—thereby demonstrating an effort to expand the scale of Beijing’s 
organizational capabilities to deal with this unanticipated issue.150 
Chinese leaders relied heavily on specialized individuals and institutions to advise 
the central leadership and implement decisions.  Since the scope of the crisis spread over 
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both the domestic and international environments and covered most areas of foreign 
affairs, a plethora of specialized departments were included in the decision-making 
process, “each implementing mandates issued by the paramount leadership” through the 
SOPs of their respective organization.151  The problem was fragmented among a wide 
array of institutions.  Since the MFA was the primary coordinating body for policy 
implementation, it is likely that the crisis management center was the FALSG supported 
by a variety of specialized foreign affairs analysts and staff personnel and tightly 
supervised and directed by the PBSC.  Under certain circumstances (often when domestic 
concerns were at stake), higher level coordination meetings would occur between certain 
CCP departments and the State Council where ministerial officials would “discuss the 
division of labor and how to act in their own spheres.”152  In turn, these specific ministers 
would coordinate within their individual institutions on how to accomplish their 
respective responsibilities. 
Existing organizational capabilities formed the repertoire of available alternatives 
and determined the nature of the chosen outcome.  As noted, the MFA was the principal 
organization for conducting bilateral negotiations throughout the crisis.  Not only was it 
an MFA overseas facility that was bombed, but the foreign affairs bureaucracy was best 
equipped to handle a diplomatic crisis with the United States.  As a result, MFA ministers 
and ambassadors became the primary interlockers in Sino-American negotiations.153  
Diplomacy rather than other tools such as military power became the appropriate method 
of signaling.  However, as already mentioned, this crisis involved more than merely 
foreign affairs.  For cases involving the Chinese public, the Ministry of Public Security 
dispatched security forces to contain the crowds.154  The Ministry of Education was used 
to coordinate student protests.155  According to interviews with Chinese media personnel, 
the CCP Department of Propaganda and the Xinhua news agency were used to 
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manipulate the protests and to echo support for leadership decisions and were explicitly 
assigned the mission to “stabilize the nation and protect people from the possible 
blindness of their long-term goals.156  Even the PLA was sent on a mission to Belgrade to 
transport PRC embassy personnel back to China.157 
From these details, it appears that once again, the cybernetic approach is more 
applicable to understanding Beijing’s behavior during crises than the rational model.  
When confronted with a complex, unanticipated problem, the PRC leadership used 
cybernetic mechanisms and institutional routines to determine a suitable course of action.  
Rather than gathering all information and employing an exhaustive search for the single 
best alternative for the situation, the leadership relied on the existing institutional 
capabilities and specialization to inform and isolate an appropriate response. 
3. Case Analysis:  Dealing with Uncertainty 
As discussed above, strict channeling of information during a crisis is a cybernetic 
method for reducing uncertainty in the decision-making process.  This tendency was 
heavily demonstrated in the Belgrade bombing event.  Following the incident, Sino-
American information channels typically available for communication were restricted or 
disregarded.  Military-to-military exchanges were halted.158  Several existing bilateral 
diplomatic channels over unrelated issues were also put on hold.159  Even calls from 
President Clinton to President Jiang Zemin on the executive hotline were unanswered by 
the Chinese leadership for the first several days of the crisis.160  The only substantial 
channel for communication that remained open was either the MFA office in China or the 
MFA-supervised PRC embassy to the United States in Washington.  In this case, 
information was so confined that it presented a hindrance to effective crisis management 
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in that for a significant time in the initial period, communication between the United 
States and China was largely nonproductive or nonexistent.   
Cybernetic logic dictates that since decision makers are simply choosing the first 
acceptable option from their repertoire of capabilities, perfect information is not required 
for a suitable course of action to be selected.  This trait was also demonstrated in this 
crisis.  Since the incident was unanticipated, and little information was available prior to 
the leadership having to make an official response, Chinese decision makers acted while 
being desperately short of complete information of the situation.  Chinese intelligence 
agencies were unable to complete even a precursory analysis prior to the first emergency 
meeting of the central leadership that set the course for Chinese action.161       
4. Case Analysis:  Adapting to Change 
There are also strong indications that experiential learning played a significant 
role in shaping both the domestic and international aspects of Beijing’s decision.  On the 
domestic front, the Chinese leadership, while initially using the protests as a negotiating 
tactic,162 was also concerned about letting the protests go too far—a concern that arose 
from memories of two prior experiences.  One of these experiences involved the large 
parades that turned into the tragic and damaging Tiananmen Square student-led 
democratic protests in 1989 that led to Jiang Zemin first taking office.163  The other 
experience was the large demonstration of the Falun Gong group outside the central 
leadership headquarters that had occurred just two weeks before the bombing.  According 
to insider accounts, both of these events had a larger than expected influence on Jiang 
Zemin and other leaders.164  As a result, the leadership maintained a cautious attitude 
regarding the management of Chinese public opinion throughout the conflict. 
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In the international scene, China used a different approach than that employed in 
the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis where the PRC was largely isolated as the aggressor 
within the international community.  In this case, China quickly sought and received the 
legitimacy of the international community by demanding that an emergency meeting of 
the United Nations Security Council be convened to discuss the issue and citing the 
bombing as a violation of China’s sovereignty and international law as established in the 
UN charter.165  
D. CASE #2:  F-8/EP-3E MIDAIR COLLISION (2001) 
1. Case Details 
On April 1, 2001, a U.S. Navy EP-3E reconnaissance plane on a routine patrol 
was intercepted by two Chinese F-8II fighters over international airspace approximately 
70 miles southeast of Hainan Island above the South China Sea.  One of the F-8 pilots, 
when executing a dangerous maneuver in extremely close proximity to the slower, larger 
EP-3, made a tragic mistake and collided with the reconnaissance plane.  Consequently, 
the Chinese fighter jet crashed, and the pilot, Lieutenant Commander Wang Wei, was 
lost.  The other F-8, unharmed, returned to base.  The EP-3, having received extensive 
damage, plummeted several thousand feet before American pilot, Lieutenant Shane 
Osborne, could stabilize it.  Emergency announcements were issued to all receivers in the 
area, and twenty minutes later, the plane was landed at the PLAN Lingshui airfield on 
Hainan Island.  The crew of twenty-four American service members emerged from the 
EP-3 into the custody of the PLA where they remained for a long eleven days while 
Washington and Beijing negotiated one of the most severe near-crisis events of the past 
twenty years.  Although the crew was allowed to return to the United States on April 12, 
the EP-3 was searched by the PRC military and was returned in pieces later on July 3.   
Crisis management between the two countries proceeded through multiple phases 
of tough resolve and bilateral cooperation with negotiations stalling over questions of 
who was at fault for the collision, legal questions of whether the EP-3 was authorized by 
international law to make an emergency landing in Chinese territory, and, when there, if 
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it was immune to search and seizure by Chinese authorities.  From the start, Beijing 
adopted a faulty story of the collision that showed the United States completely 
responsible for the incident and insisted on a formal apology from Washington to the 
Chinese people.  Since American leaders did not agree with Beijing’s view of events and 
did not accept responsibility for the collision, for violating international law with patrols 
in international airspace, or for violating international law with an emergency landing, a 
formal apology admitting guilt was unacceptable. 
Although few details of the internal decision-making process are available for 
observation, much analysis of this particular case has been conducted by a variety of 
American and Chinese diplomats and scholars.  Some of the sources that have informed 
observations included here are found in accounts by Admiral (retired) Dennis Blair (then 
Commander of United States Pacific Command and intimately involved in crisis 
management efforts), veteran analysts James Mulvenon, Paul Godwin, Shirley Kan, 
Susan Shirk, and Chinese scholar Zhang Tousheng.  In  a useful report compiled and 
edited by the Congressional Research Service under the direction of Shirley Kan, a 
variety of viewpoints of this crisis are given.  Two provocative questions have plagued 
American analysts:  1) why was Beijing’s story of the incident so different from the 
account of the collision provided by the American crew and display such variety even 
between Chinese civilian and military authorities, and 2) why did the Chinese 
government take so long to respond to Washington’s attempts to establish contact or hold 
the crew for so long?166  Mulvenon summarizes two general explanations for these 
questions—either the Chinese government experienced sharp factional conflict over its 
response including significant strain in its civil-military affairs, or Beijing was craftily 
drawing out the process as a method of diplomatic brinkmanship.167  However, as the 
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below observations indicate, there is a third dimension of this incident as well—the 
cybernetic nature of Chinese politics during the crisis.         
2. Case Analysis:  Managing Complexity 
To accommodate the crisis-induced complexity that was introduced into the 
decision-making process, Beijing relied upon cybernetic tendencies to increase the scale 
and scope of its capacity.  It employed the consensus-driven mechanisms of its 
operational decision-making body, the PBSC, to bring together the top tier of the party, 
military, and state bureaucracies to determine a course of action and promulgate general 
guidance for handling the crisis.168  Although some observers have used this case to 
support claims that Beijing’s decision making was overly centralized and that Chinese 
leadership experienced a lack of consensus with civilian-military factional disputes, other 
insightful sources have pointed to Jiang Zemin’s confidence in the collective leadership 
process as demonstrated by his beginning a two-week trip to Latin America only three 
days after the collision while Chinese decisions were being first made—a trip that would 
likely not have occurred had Jiang felt that the core of the central decision-making body 
was unstable or unable to collectively function.169  Additionally, although the incident 
was most closely related to the Chinese military and national security domains, the 
official statements following the first collective leadership meeting were from the State 
Council’s MFA and Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin, further illustrating that the 
accepted course of action had been agreed upon through collective consensus and 
executed through a collective process.170 
Beijing also managed the increased complexity following the event by increasing 
the scope of the organization’s capacity through its reliance on specialized, institutional 
capabilities and identities.  Following the emergency meeting of the PBSC, a variety of 
institutions took action to handle the crisis.  Since diplomacy as a whole was the 
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preferred response, the MFA was given the lead from the start and made the initial public 
statement, which articulated the official position of the PRC government on the collision 
and demanded an American apology.171  The MFA was given the responsibility and 
authority for coordinating initiatives, thereby becoming the crisis management center for 
negotiations.172  Given the above knowledge of the Chinese foreign affairs structure, this 
was likely accomplished through the FALSG, which had the authority to mobilize 
institutional resources throughout the organization.  Yet despite this formal coordination 
of effort, the individual identities of the institutions shaped slightly different types of 
public statements over the following days.  The MFA with its identity of diplomacy 
focused on the potential damage to Sino-American bilateral relations and pressed for a 
quick resolution.  The military focused on the issue that was central to its identity of 
national defense—getting the United States to stop “spying” on China’s military buildup 
along its southern coastlines.  The internal security services and the Department of 
Propaganda focused on the potential instability of public unrest.173   
3. Case Analysis:  Dealing with Uncertainty 
As also demonstrated in the Belgrade bombing crisis, the Chinese government 
limited uncertainty during crisis negotiations and prevented a premature response by 
restricting the information entering the decision-making process.  This is most visibly 
seen in the limited communication channels for contact with the United States.  As 
Admiral Blair observed, in the initial hours and days following the incident, neither the 
PLA nor the MFA would answer American phone calls.174  Chinese scholar Zhang 
Tuosheng observed that much of the first few days of the crisis were characterized by 
only low-level contacts between the two sides with no substantial mid or high-level 
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communication.175  He goes further to conclude that although Sino-American 
communication channels are adequate for normal affairs in times of peace, Beijing’s and 
Washington’s behavior resulted in many of the existing communication channels not 
working during the crisis.176 
Throughout the crisis, the only accepted gateway for incoming communication 
from the American side to reach the Chinese central government was through the foreign 
affairs apparatus.  However, within Beijing, most of the information it was processing 
was solely from the PLA.  Although limited information flow reduced the potential 
effects of uncertainty as the central leadership adopted a course of action, the available 
options were based tightly on only a few strands of information (some of which proved 
inaccurate) and set the tone for the duration of the conflict.177  Information was 
synthesized at only a few points in the process such as the PBSC, and even then, full 
coordination was likely hindered by not having professional military representation other 
than Hu himself.  These details illustrate two cybernetic tendencies—fragmentation and 
restricted information flow. 
4. Case Analysis:  Adapting to Change 
This crisis case strongly demonstrates two important cybernetic traits of 
adaptation—experiential learning and incremental change.  As Admiral Blair and David 
Bonfili noted in their analysis of the conflict, “actions and attitudes developed before 
2001 were important factors in the behavior of both sides during the April 2001 EP-3 
crisis.”178  Other analysts and diplomats have remarked on the repeated use of two prior 
incidents in particular as instructive references by both Chinese leadership as well as the 
PRC media throughout the event.  As two Hong Kong-based professors have observed, 
the experiences of the July 1993 Yinhe incident as well as the 1999 Belgrade embassy 
bombing led Beijing and large numbers of the Chinese public to automatically conclude 
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“that the air collision incident had been the inevitable outcome of U.S. hegemonism 
provoking China and treating China with hostility.”179  As illustrated by the Belgrade 
bombing, the Chinese leadership estimated it could again use the crisis to place the 
United States in a position where it would have to apologize for its actions and 
compensate China for damages.180  The past experience with the Belgrade bombing had 
also shown Beijing the potential danger of letting the media rile up the public to the point 
of protest and, therefore, Beijing handled the media with a much tighter rein and forced 
students to remain on their campuses.181  In order to preempt radical rhetoric in the press, 
the State Council Information Office even held briefings with news editors explaining 
that the collision was not an American attack against China.182  As described above, this 
pattern of learning primarily from past experiences (and appraising the performance of 
responses used in a past encounters) rather than taking lessons from assessments of future 
goals is typical of cybernetic decision making and is a strong departure from the rational 
paradigm.  Following the “if it is not broke, keep using it” mentality, an option that was 
somewhat successful in the past will likely be reused in what is assessed to be a similar 
situation. 
A second cybernetic tendency evidenced in this case is incremental adjustment.  
Although Beijing recognized from the 1999 Belgrade bombing crisis that it needed 
improvement in its crisis management procedures in order to more promptly respond to 
unanticipated situations, no changes were made in the two years prior to the EP-3 
case183—likely due to institutional inertia and the assessment that China had experienced 
success in the Belgrade resolution with organizational performance as it was.  Despite 
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trends in near collisions between other EP-3 aircraft and increasingly more aggressive 
PLAN pilots (a topic that had been discussed between Chinese and American officials 
repeatedly over the year prior to the collision184), no changes were made in operating 
procedures to avoid a disaster.185  Furthermore, even after the collision, despite Beijing 
demanding in negotiations that a meeting be arranged to develop procedures for avoiding 
another collision in future intercepts, post-crisis Sino-American discussions on the topic 
“never made any headway”186 and Beijing made only slight changes in its military 
behavior by having PLAN pilots keep more distance when tailing American 
reconnaissance flights—once again demonstrating the tendency for institutions to resist 
significant, rapid change.  
E. CASE #3:  SARS OUTBREAK (2002-03) 
1. Case Details 
On November 16, 2002, the first case of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS) occurred in Fushan City, one of the many urban centers in Guandong Province in 
southeast China.  Over the next two months, the contagious disease spread through 
Guandong unchecked and both military and civilian hospitals incurred a rising number of 
cases.  Information was deliberately underreported to the central government through 
both the provincial as well as PLA channels largely due to a desire to not interrupt 
sensitive political sessions of the 16th National Party Congress that had convened in 
November to complete the transition of leadership from Hu Jintao to Jiang Zemin. 
By late January, the rising casualties had made it evident to provincial officials 
that there was a problem, but only a vague travel warning was issued and insufficient 
information was provided to the public to assist with stopping the spread of the disease.  
By February, the illness had spread beyond Guandong’s borders to other provinces, Hong 
Kong, Vietnam, Canada, and Singapore.  However, under the direction of the CCP 
General Propaganda Department, the media was required to report only that the situation 
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was under control—a claim that clearly was not the case.  The PRC government refused 
to entertain scientific evidence that the disease was a highly contagious form viral 
pneumonia (the accepted party line was that it was related to a non-deadly strain of 
sexually transmitted chlamydia187) and persistently covered up the extent of the 
casualties, which by now had risen to several hundred cases and over thirty dead.188  
Finally, after a Chinese military doctor, upon observing the government’s deliberate 
attempt to underreport the number of cases, leaked to the Chinese Central Television and 
Hong Kong media (which consequently reached the international media) the true extent 
of the contagion, the international community began to hastily cancel travel to China.  
The World Health Organization issued a global alert on March 12, and several countries 
adopted defensive procedures to protect themselves against the disease.  As a result, 
Beijing was forced to acknowledge the cover-up in mid-April and quickly initiated a 
mass mobilization effort to contain and eradicate SARS.  From April to June 2003, over 
30,000 PRC citizens were quarantined in Beijing alone (sometimes through force).189 
Despite SARS being successfully contained by July 2003 through a massive 
mobilization effort (after a total 5,327 PRC citizens were infected and 349 died), the fact 
that the contagion had been able to build for five months while being covered up by the 
Chinese government has drawn intense criticism and has been explored for indications 
into the character of the PRC crisis decision-making process.  A compilation of articles 
edited by John Wong and Zheng Yongnian entitled The SARS Epidemic:  Challenges to 
China’s Crisis Management, official statements from the PRC, and other veteran analysts 
of Chinese affairs inform much of the detail provided below.      
2. Case Analysis:  Managing Complexity 
Although many have pointed to the interagency coordination issues as evidence of 
factionalism within the central government (possibly between the Jiang and Hu factions), 
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as two Chinese authors have remarked, the climate of the senior leadership—once the 
issue of SARS had been acknowledged—was one based on the consensus of collective 
leadership at the highest level.  On April 17, a meeting of the PBSC presided over by Hu 
Jintao decided that SARS was a top priority that required the collective effort of all 
bureaucracies to fight.190  Following a meeting of the Politburo chaired by Hu Jintao in 
the following week, “there appeared to be a closing of ranks to deal with the SARS 
outbreak.”191  After this meeting, key figures in the CCP made public statements to rally 
various party, government, society, and military organizations to join behind the effort to 
fight SARS behind the leadership of Hu Jintao.192  Central government pressure on 
second tier departments and ministries as well as provincial and local governments 
helped to create a unified response. 
To handle the complicated nature of a comprehensive SARS response, 
responsibilities and authorities were fragmented among a repertoire of institutions.  A 
central Leading Group for Prevention and Treatment of SARS, headed by Hu Jintao with 
Premier Wen Jiabao, PLA GSD Director Liang Guanglie (member of the CMC and 
current Minister of National Defense), as well as ministers of health from the State 
Council was established as the senior coordination group for the effort.193  The State 
Council formed a SARS Control Headquarters on 23 April, and the newly appointed 
Minister of Health Wu Yi was placed in charge of central-to-local implementation 
efforts.194  Although some authors have pointed at the resulting bureaucratic 
fragmentation and conflict at lower levels as a principal hindrance of response efforts 
(especially conflicting agendas arising between the CCP Department of Propaganda and 
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the Ministry of Health over information flow,195) this arrangement still illustrates the 
central government’s attempts to manage complexity by increasing the scale of the 
organization through fragmentation of responsibilities and authority. 
The central government also focused on specialization to increase the scope of the 
existing institutional capabilities (at the time consisting of an extremely limited repertoire 
for handling epidemics).  On April 9, 2003, Beijing announced that a group of twelve 
specialists had been formed to advise central government decision makers on SARS 
response options.  This group included five engineering professors and seven professors 
and doctors “who are the leading experts in the fields of infectious diseases, epidemics 
and respiratory diseases.”196  Implementation efforts were also focused into specialist 
groups.  The National SARS Headquarters under the direction of Minister of Health Wu 
Yi was organized into eleven specialty teams covering prevention and control, 
quarantines, research, logistics, rural services, public relations, social security, education, 
Beijing coordination, general administration, and foreign cooperation.197  According to 
PRC embassy statement, expert-based inspection teams were sent to thirty-one provinces, 
municipalities, and regions to supervise SARS efforts in the field.198     
3. Case Analysis:  Dealing with Uncertainty 
This case greatly illustrates how the CCP controls information in an attempt to 
reduce uncertainty.  As previously noted, knowledge of the true extent of the spreading 
epidemic was not pushed up through the provincial channels or the PLA channel of 
communication to the central government.  Although some have blamed this on a cultural 
tendency to minimize the reporting of any bad news in times of high politics,199 this 
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study argues that the effort to restrict information flow is a larger institutional tendency 
that is seen in various forms throughout the Chinese political system.  Since the CCP is 
focused on survival, it highly values political stability even at the expense of other issues.  
Therefore, increasing uncertainty in the decision-making process (especially during 
sensitive times of leadership transition) is seen as threatening the function of the process 
as a whole.  While this explains the reluctance of the provincial leaders and military 
hospitals to push up harmful information, it also explains the reluctance of the central 
leadership to acknowledge or respond to potentially damaging information from below.  
As witnessed by the guidance passed through the CCP Propaganda department to quiet 
the media as well as the refusal of the government to entertain any research that 
challenged the accepted party explanation of the disease, the effort to restrict the flow of 
information to only a few isolated feedback channels, while potentially disastrous to PRC 
general welfare, was an institutional way to limit uncertainty in the organization’s 
process of decision making.200 
4. Case Analysis:  Adapting to Change 
In previous crises, including the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, the 1999 
Belgrade bombing and the 2001 EP-3 incidents, the CCP secured its central position of 
power during crises when leaders placed a high priority on maintaining an untarnished, 
unified reputation for infallible governing performance.  As demonstrated in the early 
phases of the SARS epidemic, this is a value the CCP once again made efforts to 
maintain, even in the face of credible opposition—thus demonstrating not only the 
tendency for Beijing to focus on past lessons but also a potential pitfall for a government 
that does so. 
Additionally, despite “learning” from past cases the need to dramatically reform 
the PRC crisis management system as well as to introduce additional measures of 
accountability into the system, as seen in the SARS response, only incremental, creeping 
changes have been made over the past several years.  Of greater significance, however, 
are the more substantial reforms that were quickly and aggressively introduced when the 
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party was faced by the stark lack of governing performance present in the cover-up from 
November 2002 to April 2003.  The central leadership fired many party officials that had 
failed to meet performance criteria and large-scale institutional reform was implemented 
both in the public health as well as crisis management policy sectors.  As some Chinese 
academics have observed, “the government has learned a bitter lesson not to 
underestimate the importance of investing in such crucial social infrastructure as the 
healthcare sector if it were to respond promptly to any viral outbreak in the future.”201  
F. CASE #4:  PRC UNANNOUNCED ASAT LAUNCH (2007) 
1. Case Details 
On January 11, 2007, China successfully tested an anti-satellite (ASAT) 
capability by launching a medium-range ballistic missile from a mobile transporter-
erector launcher (TEL) armed with a kinetic kill vehicle (KKV) into a defunct Fengyun-
1C Chinese weather satellite approximately 530 miles up in low earth orbit.  Upon 
impact, the satellite was reduced to thousands of pieces of space debris with 950 of those 
measuring in excess of four inches, representing an existential threat to other satellites 
from multiple countries as well as the international space station. 
Perhaps the development that caused the most concern on behalf of the several 
nations that were alarmed was not the fact that China had tested a ground-launched 
ASAT capability but rather the manner in which it did so—Beijing neither notified 
anyone beforehand nor responded to international inquiries into the event for twelve days 
afterwards.  Although the United States, Australia, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Great 
Britain, Canada, and the European Union either issued formal protests or raised concerns 
about the lack of transparency China was showing as to its intentions with testing the 
ASAT, the MFA initially denied that the event had even occurred and failed to clarify 
with an official acknowledgement several days later on January 23.202   
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Much remains unknown about the Chinese decision-making process preceding the 
launch and during the weeks that followed.  Some analysts have assessed that the launch 
was a deliberate attempt by the central leadership to either show resolve over the Taiwan 
issue or an attempt to pressure the United States to agree to an international ban on space 
weaponization.  Other analysts have speculated that although the launch was deliberate, 
the international response that followed was not anticipated, leading to a PRC foreign 
policy crisis.203  Still other scholars have assessed that the civilian party leadership was 
not informed of the launch by PLA leaders,204 leading many to credit a breakdown in 
civil-military affairs as the reason behind the delayed response.205  While this study 
recognizes that lack of interagency coordination can be an issue that delayed Beijing’s 
crisis response decision-making process, it sees the cause more in terms of systemic, 
institutional constraints rather than a factional competition for power. 
2. Case Analysis:  Managing Complexity 
The first point which erodes the credibility of the “PLA intentionally not 
informing the CCP” hypothesis is that the ASAT launch was most likely a collective 
decision in the Politburo or its Standing Committee based on a consensus of senior 
leaders from all bureaucracies.  The chairman of the CMC, Hu Jintao, simultaneously 
holds the positions General Secretary of the CCP as well as PRC President.  Therefore to 
imply that the senior civilian leadership was not in the know about the launch is to 
insinuate that the PLA endorses insurrection within its senior ranks—a statement that is 
unsupported by the demonstrated professionalism of the PLA and its support of the 
central leadership as illustrated in other crisis cases studied here.  Additionally, as one 
scholar has observed, there are indications that the decision to launch was not short-fused 
but rather a deliberate decision to test an ASAT that goes back a few years.  Despite 
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Leadership Monitor 20 (2007):  4.  http://www.hoover.org/publications/clm/issues/6301437.html (accessed 
January 05, 2010). 
204 David E. Sanger and Joseph Kahn, “U.S. Tries to Interpret Silence Over China Test,” New York 
Times (21 January 2007).   
205 Bates Gill and Martin Kleiber, “China’s Space Odyssey:  What the Antisatellite Test Reveals about 
Decision-making in Beijing,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2007).    
 92
ongoing efforts to get an international ban on space weapons approved (mentioned in 
both the 2002 and 2004 PRC Defense white papers), PRC efforts of this sort were 
omitted from the 2006 version—seemingly indicating a desire to conduct ASAT tests 
without having to contradict official defense policy.206  Furthermore, as one veteran 
analyst remarks, “the fates of the PLA and CCP are inextricably intertwined.”207  If the 
PLA were to willingly undermine the legitimacy and power of the central party 
leadership it would also undermine the military’s own source of survival.  This is not to 
say, however, that the PBSC (and even the CMC), while being aware of the intention to 
conduct a launch, were fully informed of all the program specifics (this communication 
of tactical details very possibly did not occur).  As is often the case in cybernetic 
organizations, while fragmentation and specialization as well as restriction of information 
flow aids the central government in managing complexity and handling uncertainty, it 
also provides ample room for ongoing actions, while following accepted SOPs and 
institutional routines, to escape the limited attention of the top-level leaders. 
The ASAT launch also illustrates another common cybernetic concept discussed 
above—the institutional repertoire.  Since the field of available options are determined by 
the existing organizational capabilities at the time of the decision, this incident indicates 
that Beijing had determined that the use of diplomacy to stall space weaponization and 
militarization was largely unsuccessful and that a different institutional capability was 
needed to bring the desired performance—this new capability being the Chinese 
military.208  The abruptness of the launch and the failure to manage the international 
public is indicative of the characteristics of the military institution.  As is typical with 
most militaries, while there are some things that they do well, in comparison to 
institutions focused solely on diplomacy, their responses are usually more heavy-handed.  
                                                 
206 Dean Cheng, Of Satellites and Stakeholders:  China’s ASAT Test (Washington, D.C.:  Center for 
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In this scenario, the ASAT launch was simply an institutional choice lacking in the 
diplomatic capabilities necessary to soften the international response.   
3. Case Analysis:  Dealing with Uncertainty 
The ASAT case also illustrates the restricted information flow that accompanies 
many institutional choices.  As each institution focuses on the key variables most dear to 
its respective survival, it can lose sight of the actions being taken by another institution 
that could ultimately affect them both.  This could explain the lack of coordination 
between the MFA and the PLA prior to and following the launch.  Despite having senior 
level leadership coordination in the Politburo and the PBSC, the launch could have been 
seen simply as a programmatic action not deserving deliberation in a LSG where more 
intimate coordination could have occurred.  After all, China had conducted three tests 
prior to this launch with no international response.209  Why should this one be any 
different? 
The other pressing issue was why did it take so long for the Chinese government 
to respond to international inquiries?  This too can be explained in the institutional 
constraints of cybernetic decision making.  As previously mentioned, there likely was not 
a crisis management mechanism in place to handle the fall-out from the launch, since the 
central government likely underappreciated the fact that the international community 
would have an issue with what Beijing considered an “ordinary” test (as PLA officials 
remarked on January 19).210  Quite possibly, given China’s proven slowness in crisis 
response when not anticipating a conflict, it took twelve days for Beijing to get everyone 
on the same page.  In the meanwhile, all incoming communication was restricted—the 
leadership simply did not answer the phone. 
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4. Case Analysis:  Adapting to Change 
Beijing likely shaped its organizational routines leading up to the 2007 ASAT 
launch around lessons learned from the previous three launches that had occurred 
between September 2004 and February 2006.211  As a result, it was not prepared for the 
response that followed the January 2007 launch.  This once again illustrates the tendency 
for Chinese leaders to place more emphasis on lessons from past experiences than on 
assessments of future realities.  In a more strategic sense, previous crises with the United 
States had proven to Beijing the need to negotiate from a position of perceived strength.  
Consequently, Beijing was motivated to develop and test an ASAT capability in order to 
expand the depth of its repertoire of options and improve its negotiating power. 
The slow response to the international protest remains a testament to the difficulty 
of structurally and culturally changing the institutional identity and routines.  Despite 
having repeatedly learned the need for a flexible crisis management mechanism for 
resolving unanticipated conflicts, Beijing has yet to develop a system capable of agilely 
maneuvering through times of stress.   
G. CASE #5:  SICHUAN EARTHQUAKE (2008) 
1. Case Details 
On May 12, 2008, a devastating 7.9 earthquake occurred just north of Chengdu in 
Sichuan Province killing between 50,000 and 100,000 citizens and injuring many more.  
Buildings crumbled into heaps of rubble, trapping thousands of people for days.  Due to 
the area’s mountainous terrain and the extent of the damage to the landscape, early rescue 
teams were hard pressed to even hike into many of the villages.  Getting substantial 
equipment and supplies into the region was a logistical nightmare given the poor 
conditions of roads.  Beijing responded quickly and decisively, demonstrating 
improvement in handling natural disasters.  In addition, in sharp contrast to prior 
disasters, the central leadership quickly accepted international aid including relief 
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supplies from the United States, and established communication between the PLA GSD 
and United States Pacific Command within the first few days following the event. 
The Sichuan earthquake, while being used to estimate the current capabilities of 
the Chinese military,212 has not received as much attention as a case of crisis 
management.  Although details of central leadership interactions remain extremely 
limited, the following analysis illustrates a few cybernetic trends in Beijing’s response. 
2. Case Analysis:  Managing Complexity 
The Chinese government, monitoring the physical condition of the country, 
responded to a drastic decrease in performance (measured in public health) by using its 
existing organizational capabilities to restore the welfare of the affected populace to an 
acceptable range.  Collective leadership mechanisms allowed the government to mobilize 
all available organizational capabilities contained within the various bureaucratic 
institutions of the party, military, and state.  While CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao 
presided over the Politburo meeting that provided national guidance that relief efforts 
were top priority, implementation was overseen by the State Council Headquarters for 
Resisting Earthquake and Providing Relief (led by Premier Wen Jiabao and heavily 
staffed by members of the Ministry of Civil Affairs), and regional coordination and 
execution was provided by a forward command center established by the PLA GSD and 
led by GSD chief Chen Bingde.213  Present on the front lines were a variety of senior 
leadership figures personally representing the party, state, and military bureaucracies—
including President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao.  Throughout the process, the PLA 
included in its public statements its unswerving devotion to the CCP Central Committee, 
the Central Military Commission, and to Hu Jintao specifically.214  All available 
institutional capabilities were devoted to the relief effort including members of every 
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military service including the specialized Second Artillery Forces.  Understanding the 
institutional repertoire available to the central leadership can in itself explain the choices 
made to respond to this disaster. 
3. Case Analysis:  Dealing with Uncertainty 
Due to the reactive nature of this particular crisis response, uncertainty in the 
decision-making process was naturally minimal.  As opposed to other crisis cases 
analyzed above where multiple courses of action could feasibly be employed, in the case 
of the Sichuan earthquake, there was but a single choice to make—to rescue the people in 
need and thereby insure the continued legitimacy and survival of the CCP.  There was no 
denying the disastrous conditions of the quake zone (as opposed to the debates over the 
severity of the SARS epidemic).  All options available to accomplish this were present in 
the existing institutional capabilities of the organization.  All capabilities were employed 
to meet this single course of action without consideration of alternatives. 
4. Case Analysis:  Adapting to Change 
This case is similar to the other crises detailed above in that Chinese leaders drew 
heavily from lessons of past experiences when implementing relief procedures.  Just days 
prior, the military junta in Burma had refused international aid or foreign media coverage 
following a damaging typhoon and, as a result, further isolated itself in the international 
community and inflicted additional suffering on its population.  The CCP was resolved 
not to be compared to the repressive regime of Burma and responded quite the opposite 
way in its own time of need by welcoming international aid and foreign media to the 
disaster zone.  In addition, Beijing likely drew from the experiences of the 2007 
snowstorm as well as the 2003 SARS epidemic for lessons in the value of rapid response 
and military-style mass mobilization efforts.  It was as if the central leadership was 
determined to respond to the 2008 earthquake in a way that dramatically contrasted to the 
half-hearted, closed-door response made to the Tangshan earthquake in 1976 in order to 
illustrate the transformation China has made in becoming a reformed, modernized society 
open to the outside world. 
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H. CROSS-SAMPLE OBSERVATIONS 
In addition to the case-specific analyses above, a cross-sample comparison and 
contrast of all five cases reveals additional insight into the nature of the Chinese crisis 
decision-making process.   
 In all five cases, there was strong evidence that the CCP central leadership 
determined the nature of its response and promulgated national-level guidance 
through a collective decision-making process based in consensus—illustrating 
the tendency to overcome complex issues by expanding the scale of the 
organization and dividing up responsibilities.  All cases indicated the role of 
the PBSC as the key organ of power (at times, the larger Politburo was also 
heavily involved) and some variation of the Leading Small Group mechanism 
as the operational crisis management coordination center. 
 In all five cases, the central leadership relied on specialized experts in both 
decision making and implementation roles—illustrating the effort to overcome 
complex issues by expanding the scope of the organization.  Related to this 
expanded scope was the fragmentation of responsibilities and authorities both 
horizontally and vertically in the party, military, and state bureaucratic 
structures. 
 Four of the five cases exhibited the tendency of Chinese leaders to severely 
restrict information or outside communication from reaching the central 
leadership decision-making process—illustrating an attempt to limit undesired 
uncertainty prior to and after deciding on an appropriate course of action. 
 Three of the five cases included a significant period of delay prior to an 
official response or statement being issued by the central government.  
Furthermore, when the Chinese government felt it was the victim of an 
outside encroachment, it responded more quickly with an official response 
and initiated diplomatic dialogue (typically in the form of demands) than in 
the cases when the PRC government was connected with the perpetration of 
the crisis event. 
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 In all five cases, there were indications that the most important decisions that 
set the course for Chinese crisis management efforts and official Chinese 
policy were made early in the process with, in some cases, hardly any reliable 
or comprehensive information or analysis to rely upon.  Of more significance 
was the fact that in all these cases, rather than flexibly adjusting positions in 
response to new or revised information as it arrived, there were harsh attempts 
to prevent new information from changing the agreed upon party line that was 
made at the outset of the crisis—a strong illustration of cybernetic methods for 
dealing with uncertainty when confronting complex problems. 
 In all five cases, either explicit or implicit reference was made to previous 
experiences with similar (or perceived similar) situations when supporting 
certain policy positions or determining an appropriate crisis response. 
 With the exception of the SARS case, there was very little change made to the 
organization or repertoire of institutional capabilities following a crisis.  If a 
response is seen by the Chinese leadership as having been even partially 
successful in confronting similar circumstances in the past, it is likely it will 
be used again and little significant change will occur to the institutions or 
routines involved in the action.  Only when a response is acknowledged as 
having been an obvious failure will substantial change be made to the 
organization.  This is a strong cybernetic tendency that has important 
implications for what should be expected in future crises.  
 In all five cases, public perception was a key variable in the minds of leaders.  
Public opinion (sometimes in the form of violent protest or fears thereof) was 
also a heavily referenced feedback channel for monitoring this variable—
demonstrating the increasing pluralization of Chinese politics.  It also 
demonstrates the cybernetic tendency for an organization to focus on those 
variables that most closely relate to its survival—is the case of the CCP this 
means continued legitimacy anchored in public acceptance of the leadership.  
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 At the risk of comparing apples and oranges, there were indications that 
despite its expanding repertoire of diplomatic organizational capabilities, the 
PRC is still most adept at responding to domestic crises through military-style 
mass mobilization strategies.  It appeared less adept at managing international 
crises—though smaller in scale—through tactful, agile diplomacy. 
 Finally, the two of these cases that involved direct confrontation with the 
United States (the Belgrade bombing and EP-3 collision cases) showed a 
similar evolution as negotiations proceeded from an initial phase characterized 
by steadfast demands based largely on moral arguments (a common demand 
was an apology) to a second phase where Chinese leaders and diplomats 
focused more on pragmatic interests such as economic cooperation and more 
readily pursued conflict resolution to a final phase where Beijing often 
returned to its moral arguments as a face-saving measure with the confidence 
that the central issue of the conflict had already been resolved.  A highly 
desired signal to both sides during negotiations was one indicating that a 
thawing point had been reached—commonly manifested as an indication that 
Beijing was considering its core, long-term interests (which since Deng has 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
A. KEY FINDINGS 
In order to increase the chances of influencing another country’s leadership to 
adopt a certain point of view most conducive to American interests, U.S. decision makers 
must first understand both its own as well as the other country’s decision-making process.  
Although the rational approach to interpreting and predicting international relations has 
dominated the field for several decades, it fails to explain many of the choices made by 
other national governments.  The intention of this study was not to disprove the validity 
of the rational approach in general but rather to demonstrate the enhanced applicability 
and explanatory value of the cybernetic approach when interpreting and predicting 
Beijing’s decision-making behavior during times of peace and crisis.    
After defining the differences between the cybernetic and rational approaches to 
decision making, and testing through empirical analysis of Chinese politics for the nature 
of three functional variables (i.e., how the leadership manages complexity, deals with 
uncertainty, and adapts to change), this study concludes with the following explanations 
and predictions regarding a cybernetic study of Beijing’s decision-making process.215 
1. Conclusions on Cybernetics  
 The rational and cybernetic models are distinctly different and, consequently, 
exert structural and procedural influence on the decision-making process that 
results in dramatically different choices and implementation methods. 
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 The cybernetic model of decision making surpasses the usefulness of the 
rational approach in explaining the behavior of large organizations composed 
of many unique institutions with individual capabilities and identities. 
 Empirical, scientific analysis combined with historical observation of the 
leadership structure and processes within a country of interest (even largely 
opaque authoritarian regimes) can reveal an underlying construct of 
cybernetic decision making. 
 Since the cybernetic approach is simple, appropriate, falsifiable, operational, 
and valid in explaining real world decision making under complex conditions, 
it represents a valuable theory for expanding the existing knowledge of 
international relations and national security studies. 
2. Conclusions on Chinese Decision Making 
 As demonstrated in the two tests conducted in this study, the cybernetic model 
explains much about the decision-making process of the Chinese leadership 
organization. 
 Given the cybernetic character of Chinese leadership structures and processes 
as well as the relative lack of intimate knowledge on individual Chinese 
leaders, the most applicable unit of analysis for understanding the Chinese 
decision-making process is the organization or institution. 
 When confronted by complex problems, Beijing simplifies its decision-
making process and enhances the capacity of the central leadership by 
expanding the scale and scope of the party’s governing ability (and thereby 
the survivability of the CCP) through accepted, established institutional 
routines of collective leadership, fragmentation, and specialization. 
 A problem is best understood in Chinese decision making as an indication of 
lower than acceptable performance in one of the strictly monitored variables 
critical to the survival and continued power of the CCP. 
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 Beijing’s choice options are contained within its organizational repertoire of 
institutional capabilities existing at the time of the problem.  Government 
responses in times of unanticipated crisis will likely not be tailor-made to 
perfectly fit the unique demands of the situation but will instead exhibit the 
identity, cultural norms, and routines of the institution to which it belongs.   
 The effort to establish a consensus in the senior leadership is critical to the 
legitimacy and survival of the CCP as a whole and ultimately trumps factional 
differences between individual bureaucracies and institutions.  Since the value 
of consensus is greater than individualism in the Chinese leadership, common 
ground on a particularly marketable perspective of the problem and most 
acceptable solution will be quickly sought at the beginning of a crisis.  Often 
this common perspective will be based on a particular moral view that 
resonates throughout the Chinese government and populace.   
 Consensus on the most accepted course of action is quickly adopted at the 
beginning of the crisis under incomplete or incorrect information.  Afterwards, 
incoming information (even seemingly irrefutable, empirical evidence) that 
may challenge the consensus view is discouraged and suppressed as a means 
of minimizing uncertainty in the decision-making process.   
 Due to the “satisficing” character of Beijing’s search for alternatives, once a 
consensus is reached the search for other alternatives is extremely limited (a 
factor that often constricts the negotiating power and flexibility of the foreign 
affairs bureaucracy when responding to international demands). 
 Official Chinese responses are typically directed at the most troubling aspect 
of the crisis.  Subjective judgments of what the central issue is are quickly 
translated into actionable propositions for implementation.  For example, 
Beijing’s initial demand for an apology in the opening response of a crisis 
likely indicates that the most critical aspect of the conflict is domestically 
oriented (PRC public opinion) rather than internationally or security related. 
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 Official Chinese responses should not be expected from any institution or 
bureaucracy until an initial consensus is reached.  If the crisis was completely 
unanticipated, requires a response of an institutional capability that does not 
exist in the organizational repertoire, involves a sensitive issue to the Chinese 
public, or involves the international perception that China is at fault, the delay 
in any response will be extended.  During the beginning phase when 
consensus has not yet been established, neither Beijing nor anyone below 
Beijing with any rank or substantial influence is likely to answer the phone 
even if the President of the United States is on the other end of the line. 
 Since Beijing is consciously restrictive in its focus on particular aspects of the 
problem and acceptable options, senior leaders or their respective staffs may 
not necessarily be attentive to signals or pressure in the particular channel of 
strategic communication through which Washington tries to exert influence.  
For example, if the Chinese leadership is most concerned about the domestic 
stability and public opinion of the PRC populace, increased security-related or 
military-related coercion from the United States likely will not have the 
desired outcome of deescalating the situation and an alternative approach 
should be adopted. 
 Current or future Chinese responses to a crisis will strongly resemble past 
responses that enjoyed even a slight perceived element of success in similar 
situations.  Beijing is more focused on success or failure of past performance 
than on future aspirations when devising an appropriate response to a crisis.  
Beyond explicit references by senior leaders to lessons of past situations, 
implicitly the identities, cultural norms, and rules of the individual institutions 
upon which Beijing’s response options depend are derived from past 
performance appraisals. 
 Despite post-crisis “lessons learned,” institutional change in the Chinese 
organization typically occurs only gradually in small, incremental steps.  Only 
when Beijing is confronted by undeniable failure in its performance will more 
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aggressive, substantive change occur.  Many deficiencies in Chinese crisis 
management procedures exhibited in past periods of stress are more likely to 
be repeated than resolved.  Consequently, it is possible to predict and preempt 
similar institutional routines as those witnessed from past encounters with a 
moderate level of confidence and accuracy.      
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR FELLOW INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS 
In the United States Department of Defense, the task of determining the most 
applicable framework of national security decision making that a country of interest uses 
when resolving complex problems typically falls within the purview of the intelligence 
analyst.  Understanding the leadership decision-making process in a country of interest, 
however, requires more than simply knowing who talks to whom, when, and where.  
Although this information is of critical importance, as demonstrated in the opacity 
exhibited by the Chinese organization, the majority of these details remain unavailable.   
In the process of completing this study, it became apparent that much of the 
previous research only served to label the structure and describe the primary actors 
without examining the underlying principles that shaped decision-making behavior.  All 
too often these studies succeeded in describing the top levels of leaders and institutions 
but quickly turned to broad generalizations and assessments as information ran out.  Yet 
even with knowing who talks to whom, it could be impossible to accurately predict 
decision outcomes.  This simply highlights the necessity for taking what is known—how 
organizations function—and seeking ways to accurately apply these lessons to foreign 
government organizations.  By empirically testing for the applicability of certain 
organizational models (of which cybernetics is but one) in the context of a country of 
interest, more accurate typologies can be developed to predict outcomes. 
A second trend noted in previous scholarship was the heavy use (often implicitly) 
of rational assumptions with very little consideration given for other, dramatically 
different approaches to decision making.  Even within the intelligence processes that 
support contingency planning, “alternative” analysis, although changing the viewpoint of 
the adversary’s desired objectives and capabilities, does not systematically change the 
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overall decision-making construct through which leaders arrive at their choices.  Since, as 
illustrated in this study, as well as others, very simple alterations in the decision-making 
procedure can result in very different outcomes, truly alternative analysis must include 
decision-making processes other than simply the rational actor model in order to offer 
explanative and predictive inputs.216  As one intelligence professional remarked in a text 
which has become a mandatory read for many in the community, “because these mind-
sets or models serve as a “screen” or “lens” through which analysts perceive foreign 
developments, research to determine the nature of this “lens” may contribute as much to 
accurate judgments as does research focused more directly on the foreign areas 
themselves.”217 
C. AREAS FOR ADDITIONAL STUDY 
There are several potentially fruitful ways to expand the applicability of a 
cybernetic approach to Chinese decision making to include a variety of more general or 
narrower areas of emphasis.  Here are but a few avenues that materialized in the process 
of completing this study. 
In a general sense, many analysts of Chinese politics have assessed that Beijing 
will ultimately be forced to adopt substantial political change (possibly be forced to even 
embrace popular electoral democracy) as China’s economic and social spheres become 
increasingly more complex.  However, as this study has illustrated, where the rational 
model becomes more inefficient in managing complexity, the cybernetic model 
overcomes complexity through organization and expanded inclusion of simple, 
specialized institutions.  Additional organizational studies can potentially provide support 
for arguments that the CCP may be more resilient to change than some estimate. 
More narrowly, there is a wealth of helpful research that can be completed by 
focusing the cybernetic approach and methods used here on specific PRC institutions in 
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order to identify specific routines and rules that explain and predict the manner in which 
these individual entities, when “turned on” by the central government, will use their 
respective repertoires of capabilities to complete their mission and guarantee their 
institutional survival. 
Additionally, the cybernetic model can be tailored to better fit the specific case of 
Chinese politics to include, in particular, an analysis of the role that public opinion plays 
in a cybernetic organization.  As many of these crisis cases have illustrated, Beijing is 
increasingly more alert to public perception and in many cases finds the continued 
legitimacy of the CCP tied to this variable.  Understanding how this can affect the 
cybernetic process or viewing public opinion as a cybernetic actor may provide additional 
insight into Beijing’s domestic constraints.  
Finally, in addition to the content analysis and comparative tests conducted in this 
study, other quantitative and qualitative methods and evidence can provide new insights 
and support for a cybernetic view of Chinese politics that will prove useful to the 
development of operational typologies for improving the ability of the United States 
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